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Abstract—We consider the implementation of two-party cryp-
tographic primitives based on the sole assumption that no large-
scale reliable quantum storage is available to the cheating party.
We construct novel protocols for oblivious transfer and bit
commitment, and prove that realistic noise levels provide security
even against the most general attack. Such unconditional results
were previously only known in the so-called bounded-storage
model which is a special case of our setting. Our protocols can
be implemented with present-day hardware used for quantum
key distribution. In particular, no quantum storage is required
for the honest parties.
I. THE NOISY-STORAGE MODEL: DEFINITION AND RESULTS
A. Motivation: security from physical assumptions
The security of most cryptographic systems currently in use
is based on the premise that a certain computational problem is
hard to solve for the adversary. Concretely, this relies on the
assumption that the adversary’s computational resources are
limited, and the underlying problem is hard in some precise
complexity-theoretic sense. While the former assumption may
be justified in practice, the latter statement is usually an
unproven mathematical conjecture. In contrast, quantum cryp-
tographic schemes are designed in such a way that they provide
security based solely on the validity of quantum physics. No
assumptions on the adversary’s computational power nor the
validity of some complexity-theoretic statements are needed.
Unfortunately, not even the laws of quantum physics al-
low us to realize all desirable cryptographic functionalities
without further assumptions [37], [44], [39], [38], [45]. An
example of such a functionality is (fully randomized) oblivious
transfer, where Alice receives two random strings S0, S1,
while Bob receives one of the strings SC together with the
index C. Security for this primitive means that neither Alice
nor Bob can obtain any information beyond this specification.
A protocol which securely implements oblivious transfer is
desirable because any two-party computation, such as secure
identification, can be based on this building block [29], [23].
In light of this state of affairs, it is natural to consider
other physical assumptions: Motivated by similar classical
models [42], [43], the authors of [16], [15] and [60], [62],
[55] propose to assume that the adversary’s quantum storage
is bounded and noisy, respectively. The assumption of bounded
quantum storage deals with the noiseless case (but assumes a
small amount of storage), whereas the noisy-storage model
deals with the case of noise (but possibly a large amount of
storage). Here, we introduce a more general point of view
which incorporates both the amount of storage and noise. We
refer to this simply as the noisy-storage model. The previously
considered settings are special cases, as we will explain below.
Compared to the classical world, the assumption of limited
and noisy quantum storage is particularly realistic in view of
the present state of the art, and the considerable challenges
faced when trying to build scalable quantum memories. In-
deed, it is unknown whether it is physically possible to build
noise free memories. Further motivation for considering noise
as a resource for security over the mere assumption of bounded
storage comes from the fact that the transfer of the state of
a (photonic) qubit used during the execution of the protocol
onto a different carrier used as a quantum memory (such as
an atomic ensemble) is typically already noisy.
B. Contribution and methods
We consider the noisy-storage model which was previ-
ously introduced in [60], [62], [55] where it appeared in a
slightly more specialized form. All previous security proofs
in this model required additional assumptions beyond having
noise. In particular, in the analysis of [62], the adversary
was restricted to performing individual attacks using product
measurements on the qubits received in the protocol. This is a
significant restriction as multi-qubit measurements are possible
even today, and can be compared to an analysis of quantum
key distribution [4] where the eavesdropper is restricted to
measuring each qubit individually. We provide a fully general
proof of security against arbitrary attacks that bit-commitment
and oblivious transfer can be achieved in the general noisy-
storage model. This encompasses and extends all previously
considered settings [16], [15], [60], [62], [55]. As a side
effect, we also obtain significantly improved parameters for
the special case of bounded storage.
In order to obtain this result, we require a number of
methods that have not been used before either in the noisy- or
bounded-quantum-storage setting.
• We formally relate the security of our protocols to the
problem of sending information through the noisy-storage
channel. This is very intuitive, and much more natural
than previous approaches such as the restriction to in-
dividual attacks in the noisy-storage model [62], or the
assumption of bounded storage [16]. More specifically,
we show that a sufficient condition for security is that
2the number of classical bits that can be sent through
the noisy-storage channel is limited. We introduce our
generalized model in Section I-C, and state our result in
Section I-D.
• We introduce a novel cryptographic primitive called weak
string erasure (see Section III) that may be of independent
interest. We provide a simple quantum protocol that
securely realizes weak string erasure in the noisy-storage
model, in which the honest parties do not require any
quantum memory at all to execute the protocol. Our pro-
tocol can be implemented with present-day technology. In
our security proof, we require information-theoretic tools
such as the recently proven strong converse for channel
coding [36].
• We construct new protocols for bit commitment and
oblivious transfer based on weak string erasure, and prove
security against arbitrary attacks. Our protocols are purely
classical, merely using the simple quantum primitive of
weak string erasure which is a conceptually appealing
feature. We make use of various techniques such as
error-correcting codes, privacy amplification, interactive
hashing and min-entropy sampling with respect to a
quantum adversary.
Our work raises many immediate open questions and has
already led to follow-up work which we discuss in Section VI.
C. The noisy-storage model
Let us now describe more formally what we mean by a noisy
quantum memory. We think of a device whose input states are
in some Hilbert space Hin. A state ρ stored in the device
decoheres over time. That is, the content of the memory after
some time t is a state Ft(ρ), where Ft : B(Hin)→ B(Hout)
is a completely positive trace-preserving map corresponding
to the noise in the memory. Since the amount of noise may of
course depend on the storage time, the behaviour of the storage
is completely described by the family of maps {Ft}t>0. We
will make the minimal assumption that the noise is Markovian,
that is, the family {Ft}t>0 is a continuous one-parameter
semigroup
F0 = I and Ft1+t2 = Ft1 ◦ Ft2 . (1)
This tells us that the noise in storage only increases with
time, and is essential to ensure that the adversary cannot gain
any information by delaying the readout 1. This is the only
restriction imposed on the adversary who may otherwise be
all-powerful. In particular, we allow that all his actions are
instantaneous, including computation, communication, mea-
surement and state preparation.
How can we hope to obtain security in such a model?
In our protocol, we will introduce certain time delays ∆t
which force any adversary to use his storage device for a
time at least ∆t. Our assumptions imply that the best an
adversary can do is to read out the information from the
device immediately after time ∆t, as any further delay will
only degrade his information further. We can thus focus on
1This property is implicitly assumed in [62].
the channel F = F∆t when analyzing security instead of the
family {Ft}t≥0. Note that since the adversary’s actions are
assumed to be instantaneous, he can use any error-correcting
code even if the best encoding and decoding procedure may
be difficult to perform. Summarizing, our model assumes that
• The adversary has unlimited classical storage, and (quan-
tum) computational resources.
• Whenever the protocol requires the adversary to wait for
a time ∆t, he has to measure/discard all his quantum
information except what he can encode (arbitrarily) into
Hin. This information then undergoes noise described
by F .
To see how previously analyzed cases fit into our model,
note that the bounded-storage model corresponds to the case
where Hin is of limited input dimension, and F is the
identity on Hin. Concretely, [15] considers protocols with
n qubits of communication and Hin ∼= (C2)⊗νn for some
parameter ν > 0 which we call the storage rate. Security of
certain protocols was established for ν < 1/4. Furthermore,
the protocol proposed by Cre´peau [11] for oblivious transfer is
secure if the adversary cannot store any quantum information
at all, corresponding to a storage rate of ν = 0. Previous
work on the noisy-storage model [62] analyzed protocols
with n qubits of communication, where the noise F ≡ N⊗n
is an n-fold tensor product of a noisy single-qubit channel
N : B(C2) → B(C2) (i.e., Hin ∼= (C2)⊗n and ν = 1). Note,
however, that in [62] the adversary was further restricted to
performing product measurements on the qubits received in
the protocol (albeit otherwise fully arbitrary).
D. Main result
We now state our main result of establishing security in the
noisy-storage model against fully general attacks for arbitrary
channels F : B(Hin) → B(Hout). As explained, we form
a very natural relation between the security of our protocols
and the problem of transmitting information through the noisy-
storage channel2. More specifically, we prove that a sufficient
condition for security is that the number of classical bits that
can be sent through the noisy storage-channel is limited.
As usual in cryptography, we would like to compare the
adversary’s resources to those of the honest parties and/or
the complexity of operations used in the protocol. Here we
parametrize these by the number n of qubits transmitted
during the protocol. For the adversary’s storage, we therefore
consider a family {F}n of storage devices. The quality of
the adversary’s storage can then be measured (for a fixed n)
by the following operational quantity: the success probability
of correctly transmitting a randomly chosen nR-bit string
x ∈ {0, 1}nR through the storage device F , which can be
written as
PFsucc(nR) := max
{Dx}x,{ρx}x
1
2nR
∑
x∈{0,1}nR
tr(DxF(ρx)) ,
(2)
2The communication problem is equivalent to storing the string, and later
trying to read it from the device.
3where the maximum is taken over families of code states
{ρx}x∈{0,1}nR on Hin and decoding POVMs {Dx}x∈{0,1}nR
on Hout. We show that security can be obtained for arbitrary
channels with the property that the decoding probability de-
cays exponentially above a certain threshold:
Theorem I.1 (Informal statement). Suppose that for the family
of channels {F}n and the constant 0 < R < 1/2 there exist
constants n0 > 0 and γ > 0 such that for all n ≥ n0 the
decoding probability satisfies
PFsucc(nR) ≤ 2−γn . (3)
Then oblivious transfer and bit commitment can be imple-
mented using O(n) qubits of communication against an ad-
versary whose noisy storage is described by the family {F}n.
Moreover, the security is exponential in n.
Remarkably, the statement of Theorem I.1 does not require
any knowledge of the channel F beyond its relation to the
coding problem. In particular, we do not need to assume that
F is of tensor product form. This includes for example the
practically interesting case where errors are likely to occur
in bursts in the storage device, or the noisy channel itself has
memory. We discuss possible extensions and limitations of our
approach in Section VI. We point out that the length of the
input strings used in oblivious transfer and bit commitment per
communicated qubit depends on the exponent γ in (3); this is
hidden in the constant in the O-expression in Theorem I.1.
Determining the constant γ is of course no easy task for
arbitrary storage devices. To obtain explicit security param-
eters, we thus proceed to consider the special case where
the channels are of the form F = N⊗νn where n is the
number of qubits sent in the protocol, and ν ≥ 0 is the
storage rate. Our proof connects the security of protocols in
the noisy-storage model for such channels to the classical
capacity CN of N . This provides a quantitative expression
of our intuition that noisy channels which are of little use
for classical information transmission give rise to security in
the noisy-storage model. First of all, observe that there can
only exist a constant γ > 0 leading to the exponential decay
of (3) if the classical capacity CN of the channel is strictly
smaller than the rate R at which we send information through
the channel. This, however, is not sufficient, since R > CN
is not generally known to imply (3) for F = N⊗n. We are
therefore interested in channels N which satisfy the following
strong-converse property: The success probability (2) decays
exponentially for rates R above the capacity, i.e., it takes the
form
PN
⊗n
succ (nR) ≤ 2−nγ
N (R) where
γN (R) > 0 for all R > CN .
(4)
In [36], property (4) was shown to hold for a large class3 of
channels, including the depolarizing channel (see (5) below).
It was also shown how to compute γN (R). Combining The-
orem I.1 with (4), we obtain the following statement:
3The result of [36] applies to channels with certain covariance properties
and additive minimum output α-Re´nyi entropy. Examples are all unital qubit
channels, the Werner-Holevo channel and the depolarizing channel.
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Fig. 1. Our results applied to depolarizing noise F = N⊗νnr : The vertical
axis represents the noise parameter r, while the horizontal axis represents the
storage rate ν. Our protocols are secure when the pair (r, ν) is in the lower
region bounded by the solid blue curve. Security is still possible in the region
labeled with ’?’, but cannot be obtained from our analysis.
Corollary I.2 (Informal statement). Let ν ≥ 0, and suppose
that N satisfies the strong-converse property (4). If
CN · ν < 1
2
,
then oblivious transfer and bit commitment can be imple-
mented with polynomial resources (in n) and exponential
security against an adversary with noisy storage F = N⊗νn.
For the special case of bounded (noise-free) qubit storage
(CN = 1) this gives security for ν < 1/2.
An important example for which we obtain security is the
d-dimensional depolarizing channel Nr : B(Cd) → B(Cd)
defined for d ≥ 2 as
Nr(ρ) := rρ+ (1− r) I
d
for some fixed 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 , (5)
which replaces the input state ρ with the completely mixed
state with probability 1 − r. For d = 2, this means that the
adversary can store νn qubits, which are affected by inde-
pendent and identically distributed noise. It has been shown
that the depolarizing channel exhibits the strong-converse
property [36]. To see for which values of r we can obtain
security, we need to consider the classical capacity of the
depolarizing channel as evaluated by King [31]. For d = 2,
i.e., qubits, it is given by
CNr = 1 +
1 + r
2
log
1 + r
2
+
1− r
2
log
1− r
2
.
Figure 1 shows the region in the (r, ν)-plane corresponding
to the noise channel F = N⊗νnr , where we allow n qubits
of communication in the protocol. This is obtained from
Corollary I.2 (The depolarizing channel Nr satisfies the cor-
responding conditions).
Comparison to the bounded-storage model: depolarizing
noise: It was previously observed [53] that the case of depolar-
izing storage noise (i.e., r < 1) can be dealt with using results
obtained in the bounded-storage model (i.e., r = 1) when the
noise is sufficiently strong. More precisely, the results of [15]
can be extended to give non-trivial statements if the “effective”
dimension of the storage system to be less than n/4, where n
4is the number of qubits communicated in the protocol 4. We
sketch such a simple dimensional analysis to illustrate that
our model offers significant improvements over the bounded-
storage analysis: we obtain security even at lower noise levels
and higher storage rates.
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Fig. 2. Security for depolarizing noise parameters (1, ν) with ν < 1/4 was
established in the bounded-storage model (BSM). Our simple argument Our
more refined protocols and analysis give significantly improved parameters of
ν < 1/2 for the bounded-storage model, for which the same argument extends
security to the region bounded by the green dot-dashed curve. However,
our work still extends this region even further by considering noisy instead
of merely bounded storage (solid blue curve). We stress that such a naı¨ve
dimensional analysis does not apply to other channels (such as the Two-Pauli
channel), while our more refined analysis gives results even in such cases.
Concretely, consider the noise channel F = N⊗νnr :
B((C2)⊗νn) → B((C2)⊗νn) (cf. (5) for d = 2). Applying
depolarizing noise to any of the νn systems C2 means that
the state on this system is replaced by the completely mixed
state with probability 1 − r. We can think of an indicator
random variable Eνn = (E1, . . . , Eνn) ∈ {0, 1}νn, where Ei
is 1 if and only if the i-th qubit is replaced by the completely
mixed state. These “erasure” variables are independent and
identically distributed Bernoulli variables with parameter r =
PEi(0). In particular, the number of erasures
|Eνn| =
νn∑
i=1
Ei
is distributed according to the binomial distribution with νn
trials, each of which succeeds with probability 1− r.
We now assume that the adversary is given the location
of the erasures Eνn in addition to the output of the channel.
Note that this can only make the adversary more powerful.
Conditioned on the locations Eνn, the “effective dimension”
of his channel is equal to 2νn−|Eνn|. Hence, we may think of
an “effective” storage rate νeff given by the random variable
νeff = ν − |E
νn|
n
.
We know from the bounded storage model analysis [15] that
for νeff < 14 , the previously studied protocols provide security.
4We compare the randomized oblivious transfer protocol of [15] to our
protocol based on weak string erasure.
Overall, we therefore conclude that security can be obtained
from the noisy channel F if Pr[νeff > 14 ] is exponentially
small. Note that by Chernoff’s inequality
Pr [νeff∗ > 1/4] = Pr [|Eνn| < (1− δ)µ] < e−µδ2/2
if δ =
1− 4νr
4ν(1− r) > 0 , where µ = nν(1 − r) .
In particular, we conclude that we obtain security for
νr <
1
4
. (6)
Figure 2 compares the curve of this equation (6) to the
results we will derive below. We see that for the noiseless
case (r = 1), our analysis provides security for storage rates
ν < 1/2, extending previous results (i.e., ν < 1/4 in [15]) in
the bounded-storage model. This improvement stems from the
fact that (for oblivious transfer) our protocol uses a different
classical post-processing based on interactive hashing instead
of the min-entropy splitting tool of [15]. Note that this requires
additional rounds of classical communication.
One may wonder whether a security proof may alternatively
be obtained based on the idea of simulating the storage
noise F = N⊗νn using a limited number of qubits. For
channels without memory, the quantum reverse Shannon theo-
rem [5] tells us that F can be simulated using a certain number
of (noise-free) qubits when the sender and receiver share
entanglement. Hence the total size of the system consisting
of the noise-free qubits and the entanglement is rather large.
However, as explained in [5], the theorem implies an expo-
nential decay of the decoding probability as in (4), but only
for rates R greater than the entanglement-assisted capacity
of the channel N . Our security results thus extend to this
regime by our new analysis. The fact that the entanglement-
assisted capacity is generally greater than the unassisted one
suggests that such a simulation-based approach is suboptimal:
we are essentially overestimating the adversary’s capabilities
by allowing him to use (noise-free, time-like) entanglement.
Let us give a simple concrete example that provides some
intuition on why bounding the adversary’s information by the
size of his storage device is generally undesirable. Imagine
that the adversary’s channel F replaces the n input qubits by
a fixed state with overwhelmingly high probability and leaves
the input untouched with negligible probability 2−n. Clearly,
the number of noise-free qubits required to simulate this
channel is equal to n, yet the adversary’s decoding probability
will be exponentially small. Simply bounding the adversary’s
information gain in terms of his storage as in the bounded-
storage analysis [15] therefore significantly overestimates his
5abilities.5
E. Techniques: weak string erasure
Before describing our protocols and proving Theorem I.1,
we give a short overview of the techniques involved.
First, we introduce a primitive called weak string erasure,
which may be of independent interest. Our protocols for
oblivious transfer and bit commitment are then based on this
primitive. Weak string erasure provides Alice with a random
bit-string Xn ∈ {0, 1}n, while Bob receives a randomly
chosen substring XI = (Xi1 , . . . , Xir ), together with the
index set I = {i1, . . . , ir} specifying the location of these
bits. Security of weak string erasure roughly means that Bob
will remain ignorant about a significant amount of information
about Xn, while security against Alice means that she does
not learn anything about I (for a precise definition, we defer
the reader to Section III).
We provide a protocol for weak string erasure in the noisy-
storage model. This protocol can be implemented with present-
day hardware used for quantum key distribution. In particular,
it does not require the honest parties to have any form of
quantum memory. We prove security of this protocol for
channels F as stated in Theorem I.1. Security against (even
an all-powerful) Alice follows from the fact that the protocol
only involves one-way communication from Alice to Bob. The
security analysis in the presence of a malicious Bob limited
by storage noise F is more involved. Our proof combines
an entropic uncertainty relation involving post-measurement
information [1], [15] with a reformulation of the problem
as a coding scheme: Essentially, the uncertainty relation im-
plies that with high probability (over measurement outcomes),
Bob’s classical information about Xn before using his storage
is limited. We then show that this implies that any successful
attacker Bob needs to encode classical information at a high
rate into his storage device. However, the assumed noisiness
of F precludes this.
Having built a protocol for weak string erasure, we proceed
to present protocols for bit commitment and oblivious transfer.
The case of bit commitment is particularly appealing: It is
essentially only based on weak string erasure and a classical
code, and requires little additional analysis. Our approach
to realizing oblivious transfer is somewhat more involved:
Here weak string erasure is combined with a technique called
interactive hashing [52]. The output of interactive hashing is
a pair of substrings of X , one of which is completely known
to Bob, while he only has partial knowledge about the other.
Privacy amplification [50] is then used to extract completely
5One may argue that this example is artificial, and can easily dealt with
by “smoothing”: the channel is exponentially close to one which can be
simulated with no qubits at all. More complex examples exist even classically:
Imagine the adversary has some information B about a randomly chosen n-
bit classical string X , where B is the result of sending the string X through
a classical channel that outputs the first i ∈ {1, . . . , n} bits of X with
probability pi = 2−i for i < n and pi = 2 · 2−i for i = n. In cryp-
tography the adversary’s information is measured in terms of the min-entropy
H∞(X|B) = n−log(1/(n+1)). Furthermore, H0(B) = log rank(B) = n
and for even for a small smoothing parameter ε = 2−k , one still has
Hε
0
(B) ≥ n − log(1/ε). Knowing the size of B only gives us the trivial
bound H∞(X|B) ≥ H∞(X) −H0(B) = 0, although the conditional min-
entropy is almost maximal.
random bits. The security analysis of this protocol requires
the use of entropy sampling with respect to a a quantum
adversary [32].
As as side remark, note that Kilian [29] showed that obliv-
ious transfer is universal for secure two-party computation.
In particular, bit commitment could be built from oblivious
transfer, but this reduction is generally inefficient.
II. TOOLS
We briefly introduce all necessary notation as well as several
important concepts we will need throughout the paper. For
weak string erasure we require the notion of min-entropy
(Section II-B1), uncertainty relations (Section II-B3), as well
as an understanding of how storage noise leads to information
loss for the cheating party (Section II-C). In our protocols
for bit-commitment and oblivious transfer from weak string
erasure, we additionally require the concepts of smooth min-
entropy (Section II-B2) and secure keys (Section II-B4) re-
spectively, and a number of tools, namely privacy amplification
(Section II-D1), sampling of min-entropy (Section II-D2), and
finally interactive hashing (Section II-D4).
A. Notation
For an integer n, let [n] : = {1, . . . , n}. We use 2[n] : =
{S | S ⊆ [n]} to refer to the set of all possible subsets of [n],
including the empty set ∅. For an n-tuple xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
Xn over a set X and a (non-empty) set I = {i1, . . . , iℓ} ∈
2[n], we write xI for the subtuple xI = (xi1 , . . . , xiℓ) ∈ X ℓ.
We use upper case letters to denote a random variable X
distributed according to a distribution PX over a set X , and
use lower case letters x for elements x ∈ X . Joint distributions
of e.g., three random variables (X,Y, Z) on X × Y × Z
are denoted by PXY Z . Given a function f : X → Y , any
distribution PX of a random variable X gives rise to another
jointly distributed random variable Y = f(X): The joint
distribution PXY ≡ PXf(X) is given by
PXf(X)(x, y) = PX(x)δf(x),y , (7)
where δi,j is the Kronecker symbol. An important example
is the case where Xn ∈ {0, 1}n is a random bitstring and
I ∈ 2[n] is a random subset of [n], where Xn and I have joint
distribution PXnI . In this case, the joint distribution PXnIZ ≡
PXnIXI describes e.g., a situation where some bits Z = XI
of a string Xn are given, together with a specification I of
where these bits are located in the original string.
We use B(H) to denote the set of bounded operators on a
Hilbert space H. A (quantum) state is a Hermitian operator
ρ ∈ B(H) satisfying tr(ρ) = 1 and ρ ≥ 0. Quantum states
can be used to encode classical probability distributions: for
a (finite) set X , we fix a Hilbert space HX ∼= (C|X |) and an
orthonormal basis {|x〉 | x ∈ X} of HX . This will be referred
to as the computational basis. A probability distribution PX
on X can then be encoded into the classical state (c-state)
ρX =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| .
6Of particular interest is the uniform distribution over X , which
gives rise to the completely mixed state on HX denoted by
the shorthand
τX :=
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
|x〉〈x| .
States describing classical information (random variables)
and truly quantum information simultaneously are termed
classical-quantum or cq-states. They are described by bipartite
systems, where the classical part of the state is diagonal with
respect to the computational basis. Concretely, let HQ be an
additional Hilbert space. A state ρXQ on HX ⊗HQ is a cq-
state if it has the form
ρXQ =
∑
x∈X
PX(x) |x〉〈x|︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
⊗ ρx︸︷︷︸
Q
. (8)
In other words, such a state ρXQ encodes an ensemble of states
{PX(x), ρx}x∈X on HQ, where ρx is the conditional state on
Q given X = x. The notion of cq-states directly generalizes to
multipartite systems, where classical parts are diagonal with
respect to the computational basis. We often fix an ordering of
the multipartite parts, and indicate by c or q whether a part is
classical or quantum. We can also apply functions to classical
parts as before. For a function f : X → Y ,
ρXf(X)Q =
∑
x∈X ,
y∈Y
PXf(X)(x, y) |x〉〈x|︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
⊗ |y〉〈y|︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(X)
⊗ ρx︸︷︷︸
Q
(9)
is the ccq-state encoding the pair (X, f(X)) of classical
random variables (cc) distributed according to (7) as well as
the quantum information Q (q) (which depends only on X in
this case). Note that in (9), the systems on the rhs. are uniquely
determined by the expression on the lhs. We will therefore
omit the braces below. Given a state ρQ1Q2 on systems Q1
and Q2, we also use ρQ1 = trQ2(ρQ1Q2) to denote the state
obtained by tracing out Q2.
The Hadamard transform is the unitary described by the
matrix
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
in the computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉} of the qubit Hilbert
space C2. For the n-qubit Hilbert space, we let
Hθ
n |xn〉 := Hθ1 |x1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗Hθn |xn〉
for xn = (x1, . . . , xn), θn = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ {0, 1}n .
We also call states of this form BB84-states.
Finally, we need a distance measure for quantum states on a
Hilbert space H. We use the distance determined by the trace
norm ‖A‖1 := tr
√
A†A for bounded operators A ∈ B(H). We
will say that two states ρ, σ ∈ B(H) are ε-close if 12‖ρ−σ‖1 ≤
ε, which we also write as
ρ ≈ε σ .
B. Quantifying adversarial information
1) Min-entropy and measurements: One of the main prop-
erties of the weak string erasure-primitive is that the ad-
versary’s (quantum) information Q about the generated bit-
string X is limited. To make this statement precise, we first
need to introduce an appropriate measure of information.
Throughout, we are interested in the case where the adversary
holds some (possibly quantum) informationQ about a classical
random variable X . This situation is described by a cq-
state ρXQ as in (8). A natural measure for the amount of
information Q gives about X is the maximal average success
probability that a party holding Q has in guessing the value
of X . For a given cq-state ρXQ, this guessing probability can
be written as
Pguess(X |Q) := max
{Dx}x
∑
x
PX(x)tr(Dxρx) , (10)
where the maximization is over all POVMs {Dx}x∈X on HQ.
It will be convenient to turn (10) into an conditional entropy-
like quantity, called the min-entropy, which is given by 6
H∞(X |Q) := − logPguess(X |Q) . (11)
Note that the min-entropy was originally defined [49] for
arbitrary bipartite states ρAB , as we will discuss in more detail
below.
As an illustrative, yet important, example consider the
following ccq-state on HX ⊗HΘ ⊗HQ ∼= (C2)⊗3
ρXΘQ =
1
4
∑
x,θ∈{0,1}
|x〉〈x| ⊗ |θ〉〈θ| ⊗Hθ|x〉〈x|Hθ (12)
This state arises when encoding a uniformly random bit X
using either the computational basis (Θ = 0) or the Hadamard
basis (Θ = 1) chosen uniformly at random. Clearly, we have
H∞(X) = 1 ,
H∞(X |Θ) = 1 , and
H∞(X |QΘ) = 0 ,
where the last identity is a consequence of the fact that
given Θ = θ, the operation Hθ can be undone, such that a
subsequent measurement in the computational basis provides
X with certainty. Note that this is a special case of the identity
H∞(X |QΘ) = − log E
θ←PΘ
[
2−H∞(X|Q,Θ=θ)
]
, (13)
for a general cq-state ρXQΘ with classical part Θ, where
Eθ←PΘ denotes the expectation value over the choice of Θ,
and H∞(X |Q,Θ = θ) is the min-entropy of the conditional
state
ρX|Q,Θ=θ =
∑
x∈{0,1}
PX|Θ=θ(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗Hθ|x〉〈x|Hθ .
Returning to the state (12), it can also be shown [1] that
H∞(X |Q) = − log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)
.
6All logarithms are taken to base 2.
72) Smooth min-entropy: When building oblivious transfer
from weak string erasure, we will need to employ a more gen-
eral definition of the min-entropy given in [49]. For arbitrary
(not necessarily unit-trace, or cq) bipartite density operators
ρAB this quantity is defined as
H∞(A|B)ρ = − log inf
σB≥0
ρAB≤IA⊗σB
tr σB , (14)
where we use the subscript ρ to indicate what state the
quantity refers to. In [34], it was shown via semidefinite
programming duality that for a cq-state ρXQ, definition (14)
of H∞(X |Q) coincides with definition (11) in terms of the
guessing-probability Pguess(X |Q). The advantage of (14) is
that it allows us to maximize over neighborhoods of ρXQ.
This leads to the definition of smooth entropy [49], which is
defined7 as
Hε∞(X |Q)ρ := sup
ρ¯XQ≥0:
1
2‖ρ¯XQ−ρXQ‖1≤tr(ρXQ)·ε
tr(ρ¯XQ)≤tr(ρXQ)
Hε∞(X |Q)ρ¯ .
(15)
We will also use the fact that if ρXQ is a cq-state, the
supremum can be restricted to density operators ρ¯XQ where
X is classical and has the same range as the original X .
Definition (15) will be convenient for our proof: Roughly,
we will construct some state that has high min-entropy. We
then show that the state created during a real execution of the
protocol is ε-close to this state. By the above definition, the
actual state generated in the protocol has high smooth min-
entropy.
A useful property of the smooth min-entropy is that it obeys
a chain rule [49, Theorem 3.2.12], which states that for any
ccq-state ρXYQ, we have
Hε∞(X |Y Q)ρ ≥ Hε∞(X |Q)ρ − log |Y| , (16)
where |Y| is the size of the support of Y .
3) Uncertainty relations for post-measurement information:
When showing the security of weak string erasure, we need
to consider a setting where an adversary can first extract some
classical information K given access to a quantum system Q
and later obtains some additional information Θ. His objective
is to guess the value of a random variable X . Suppose he
applies a measurement described by a POVM {Ek}k to Q,
and retains only the measurement result k. We can think of
this as a completely positive trace-preserving map (CPTPM)
K : B(HQ) → B(HK). When he performs this measurement
on the Q-part of a cq-state ρXQ, we get
ρXK(Q) := (IX ⊗K)(ρXQ)
=
∑
k
trQ ((IX ⊗ Ek)ρXQ)⊗ |k〉〈k| ,
which is a cc-state (i.e., an encoded joint distribution PXK )
if X is classical. Due to its definition, the min-entropy
H∞(X |Q) is intimately connected with such measurements,
and in fact it is easy to see that
H∞(X |Q) = min
K
H∞(X |K(Q)) . (17)
7Unlike in [49], we require that half the 1-norm is bounded. This ensures
that Hε∞(X|Q)ρ ≥ H∞(X|Q)σ if ρXQ ≈ε σXQ.
This important identity relates min-entropies given quantum
information Q to min-entropies given classical information
K = K(Q).
Returning to the example given in (12), let us consider what
happens if the adversary learns the basis information Θ after
the measurement K. In [1, Theorem 4.7] it was shown that
the minimal post-measurement min-entropy optimized over all
measurements K obeys
min
K
H∞(X |K(Q)Θ) = − log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)
,
which in the case of our example matches the min-
entropy H∞(X |Q) without post-measurement information Θ.
In our security proof, we will need to consider n repetitions
of the state (12), that is,
ρXnΘnQ = ρ
⊗n
XΘQ ,
where Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Θn = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn) are n-bit
strings, and HQ ∼= (C2)⊗n. It follows from [61, Lemma 2]
and [1] that
min
K
H∞(X
n|K(Q)Θn) = −n · log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)
. (18)
A generalization of this relation to smooth min-entropy is
min
K
Hε∞(X
n|K(Q)Θn) ≥ n
(
1
2
− 2δ
)
where δ ∈]0, 1
2
[ and ε = exp
(
− δ
2n
32(2 + log 1δ )
2
)
.
(19)
This relation follows from [15, Corollary 3.4] using the stan-
dard purification trick (cf. [64, Lemma 2.3]). Our construction
of a protocol for weak string erasure will make essential use
of (18) and (19).
4) Secure keys and what it means to be ignorant: We
will often informally say that an adversary “does not know
anything” or “does not learn anything” or “is ignorant” about
some random variable X , even when he holds some (quantum)
information Q. In terms of the cq-state ρXQ this means that X
is uniformly distributed on X , and independent of Q, that is,
ρXQ = τX ⊗ ρQ . (20)
Clearly, for such a state, the uncertainty about X given Q
is maximal, which in terms of the min-entropy means that
H∞(X |Q) = log |X |. For ρXQ as in (20), X is also referred
to as an ideal key with respect to Q.
In practice, we are generally forced to work with approx-
imately ideal keys, where X is called a ε-secure key with
respect to Q if ρXQ is ε-close to the ideal state τX ⊗ ρQ, that
is,
ρXQ ≈ε τX ⊗ ρQ . (21)
This notion of a secure key behaves nicely under composi-
tion [3], [50], [33].
8C. Processes that increase uncertainty
To show the security of weak string erasure, we need to
capture the amount of “uncertainty” that an adversary has
as a result of his noisy storage F . First, let us consider
general processes which increase uncertainty. Note that from
the definitions, it is immediate [49, Theorem 3.1.12] that the
min-entropy satisfies the following monotonicity property: for
every CPTPM F : B(HQ)→ B(HQ′), we have
H∞(X |F(Q)) ≥ H∞(X |Q) . (22)
An important case is where HQ = HQ1Q2 is bipartite, and
F = trQ2 is the partial trace over the second system Q2. We
then get
H∞(X |Q1) ≥ H∞(X |Q1Q2) , (23)
reflecting the fact that “forgetting” information makes it harder
to guess X .
Inequality (22) is insufficient for our purposes, and we will
need a more quantitative estimate on the increase of entropy
due to a channel F representing the adversary’s memory.
Clearly, such an estimate will depend on properties of F .
Here we express the bound in terms of the function PFsucc(n)
introduced in (2). Intuitively, the following lemma shows
that the uncertainty about X after application of F to Q is
related to the problem of transmitting classical bits through
the channel F , where the number of bits is given by the min-
entropy of X .
Lemma II.1. Consider an arbitrary cq-state ρXQ and a
CPTPM F : B(HQ) → B(Hout). Then H∞(X |F(Q)) ≥
− logPFsucc(⌊H∞(X)⌋).
Proof: Let k := ⌊H∞(X)⌋. It is well-known (see
e.g., [56]) that probability distributions PX with min-entropy
at least k are convex combinations of “flat” distributions, i.e.,
uniform distributions over subsets of X of size 2k. In other
words, there is a joint distribution PXT , where T is distributed
over subsets of size 2k, such that
PX(x) =
∑
t
PT (t)PX|T=t(x) and
PX|T=t is uniform on t ⊂ X .
The distribution PXT together with ρXQ gives rise to a state
ρXQT whose partial trace is equal to ρXQ. Again using (23),
we get
H∞(X |F(Q)) ≥ H∞(X |F(Q)T ) .
By property (13) of the min-entropy when conditioning on
classical information, we have
H∞(X |F(Q)T ) = − log E
t←PT
[
2−H∞(X|F(Q),T=t)
]
, (24)
where Et←PT denotes the expectation value, and
H∞(X |F(Q), T = t) is the min-entropy of the conditional
state
ρXF(Q)|T=t =
∑
x
PX|T=t(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ F(ρx) .
Now we use the fact that PX|T=t is uniform over a set of
size 2k, and the definition of PFsucc(n). This leads to
H∞(X |F(Q), T = t) ≥ − logPFsucc(k)
for all t in the support of PT .
(25)
Combining (24) with (25) gives the claim.
We now give a straightforward but important generalization
of this result.
Lemma II.2. Consider an arbitrary ccq-state ρXTQ, and let
ε, ε′ ≥ 0 be arbitrary. Let F : B(HQ) → B(HQout) be an
arbitrary CPTPM. Then
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X |TF(Q)) ≥ − logPFsucc
(⌊
Hε∞(X |T )− log
1
ε′
⌋)
.
Proof: Clearly, the statement for ε = 0 implies the
statement for any ε > 0 because a CPTPM cannot increase
distance. To prove the statement for ε = 0, we consider
the quantities 2−H∞(X|T=t) of the conditional states ρX|T=t,
together with the distribution PT over T defined by the
state ρXTQ. Applying Markov’s inequality Pr[Z ≥ c] ≤ E[Z]c
for any real-valued random variable Z and constant c > 0, we
obtain
Pr
t←PT
[
2−H∞(X|T=t) ≥ 2−H∞(X|T )+log 1ε′
]
≤
ε′
(
2−H∞(X|T )
)−1
E
t←PT
[
2−H∞(X|T=t)
]
= ε′ .
This implies that the distribution PT has weight at least 1−ε′
on the set
Good =
{
t ∈ T | H∞(X |T = t) ≥
⌊
H∞(X |T )− log 1
ε′
⌋}
.
(26)
Accordingly, we can rewrite ρXTQ as a convex combination
ρXTQ = (1− p) · ρXTQ|T 6∈Good + p · ρXTQ|T∈Good where
p = PT (Good) ≥ 1− ε′ .
(27)
Set σXTQ := ρXTQ|T∈Good. From (27), we conclude that
1
2‖ρXTQ−σXTQ‖1 ≤ ε′. By the monotonicity of the distance
under CPTPM, it therefore suffices to show that
H∞(X |TF(Q))σ ≥ − logPFsucc
(⌊
H∞(X |T )ρ − log 1
ε′
⌋)
.
(28)
For this purpose, note that σXTF(Q) is given by the expression
σTXF(Q) =
∑
t∈Good
PT |T∈Good(t)|t〉〈t| ⊗ ρXF(Q)|T=t
In particular, by using (13) again, we have
2−H∞(X|TF(Q))σ = E
t←PT |T∈Good
[
2−H∞(X|F(Q),T=t)ρ
]
(29)
Using Lemma II.1 (applied to the conditional state ρXQ|T=t),
we conclude that
H∞(X |F(Q), T = t)ρ ≥ − logPFsucc
(
⌊H∞(X |T )ρ − log 1
ε′
⌋
)
for all t ∈ Good .
(30)
The claim (28) immediately follows from (30) and (29).
9D. Defeating a quantum adversary: essential building blocks
In order to build oblivious transfer and bit commitment
from weak string erasure, we will employ three additional
tools: first, we require privacy amplification against a quan-
tum adversary [49], [50] as explained in Section II-D1. For
oblivious transfer, we also need the notion of min-entropy
sampling outlined in Section II-D2. In particular, we discuss
how min-entropy about classical information is approximately
preserved when considering randomly chosen subsystems. We
then show in Section II-D4 how random subsets can be chosen
in a cryptographically secure manner with a protocol called
interactive hashing.
1) Privacy amplification: Intuitively, privacy amplification
allows us to turn a long string X , about which the adversary
holds some quantum information Q, into a shorter string Z =
Ext(X,R) about which he is almost entirely ignorant. The
maximal length of this new string is directly related to the min-
entropy H∞(X |Q) from Section II-B. In order to obtain this
new string, we will need a 2-universal hash function: Formally,
a function Ext : {0, 1}n ⊗ R → {0, 1}ℓ is called 2-universal
if for all x 6= x′ ∈ {0, 1}n and uniformly chosen r ∈R R, we
have Pr[Ext(x, r) = Ext(x′, r)] ≤ 2−ℓ.
Theorem II.3 (Privacy amplification [49], [50]). Consider a
set of 2-universal hash functions Ext : {0, 1}n⊗R→ {0, 1}ℓ,
and a cq-state ρXnQ, where Xn is an n-bit string. Define
ρXnQR = ρXnQ⊗ τR, i.e., R is a random variable uniformly
distributed on R, and independent of XnQ. Then
ρExt(Xn,R)RQ ≈ε′ τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ ρRQ
where ε′ := 2− 12 (H
ε
∞(X
n|Q)−ℓ)−1 + 2ε
for all ε > 0.
It is important to stress that the extracted key Ext(Xn, R)
is secure even if the adversary is given R in addition to Q.
Theorem II.3 immediately gives rise to a procedure allowing
parties sharing some random variable Xn to extract a key
secure against an adversary holding Q. Indeed, one party can
simply use independent randomness to pick r ∈R R uniformly
at random, and distribute (publicly) the value of r. Because
2-universal hash functions can be efficiently constructed (e.g.,
using linear functions [10]), this privacy amplification protocol
is efficient [9], [27], [7].
2) Min-entropy sampling: For oblivious transfer, we will
make use of the sampling property of min-entropy which
was first established by Vadhan [59] in the classical case,
and in [32] for the classical-quantum case. Consider a cq-
state ρXnQ, where Xn = (X1, . . . Xn) is an n-bit string. An
important property of smooth min-entropy is that the min-
entropy rate
Hε∞(X
n|Q)
n
(31)
is approximately preserved when considering a randomly
chosen substring XS of Xn. In some sense, we can therefore
think of (31) as the (average) min-entropy of an individual
bit Xi given Q.
The corresponding technical statement is slightly more
involved. In essence, it requires to pick a subset S from a
distribution PS over subsets of [n] with certain properties (PS
needs to be a so-called averaging sampler, see e.g., [22]).
For concreteness, we consider the special case where PS is
uniformly distributed over subsets of size s = |S|. Vadhan’s
result for the classical case [59] then shows that, for suffi-
ciently large s, we have
Hε∞(XS |C)
s
≥ H∞(X
n|C)
n
− δ ,
with high probability over the choice of S, for some small
ε > 0 and δ > 0. An analogous statement for the cq-case is
given in [32]. A major difference is that the result of [32] for
the quantum setting requires Xi to be a block, i.e., a β-bit
string instead of a single bit.
Since our work is mainly a proof of principle, we do
not yet care about optimality or efficiency. We therefore
choose S to be uniform over all subsets of a fixed size s.
Furthermore, it is sufficient for our purposes to ensure that
the min-entropy rate decreases by at most a factor of 2. Note
that for technical reasons, the results in [32] requires the
bit string to be partitioned into blocks of size β. A result
in [66] shows however that the same bound must also hold
for uniform bitwise sampling. This leads us to the following
statement, which we derive by specializing the results of [32]
and combining it with the result in [66] (see appendix A for
details).
Lemma II.4 (Min-entropy sampling, [32] combined
with [66]). Let ρXmβQ be a cq-state, where Xmβ is an
mβ-bit string. Let
Hε∞(X
mβ |Q)
mβ
≥ λ
be a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy rate of Xmβ
given Q. Let ω ≥ 2 be a constant, and assume s, β ∈ N are
such that
s ≥ m/4 and β ≥ max
{
67,
256ω2
λ2
}
, (32)
and let PS be the uniform distributions over subsets of [mβ]
of size sβ. Then
Pr
S
[
Hε+4δ∞ (XS |Q)
sβ
≥
(
ω − 1
ω
)
λ
]
≥ 1− δ2
where δ = 2−mλ
2/(512ω2) .
3) Aborting a protocol: As our protocols allow players to
be malicious, they may abort simply by not sending a message.
One way to handle this is to add a special symbol “aborted”
to the definition of each primitive, and to handle this case
separately in the protocol and the proof. For simplicity, we
will take a different approach here. Whenever a player does
not send any message8 (or a message that does not have the
right format) the other player simply assumes that a particular
valid message was sent, for example the string containing only
zeros. Obviously, the malicious player could have sent this
message himself, so refusing to send a message does not give
8Note that to decide whether Alice has sent a message requires to have an
upper bound on the delivery time of a message.
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any advantage to him. From now on we will therefore assume
that all players always send a message when they are supposed
to.
4) Interactive hashing: A final tool we need is interactive
hashing [18], [19], [52] first introduced in [47]. This is a two-
party primitive where Bob inputs some string W t, and Alice
has no input. The primitive then generates two strings W t0 ,
W t1 , with the property that one of the two equals W t. For
a protocol implementing this primitive, security is intuitively
specified by the following conditions: Alice does not learn
which of the two strings is indeed equal to W t. Conversely,
Bob should have very little control over the other string created
by the protocol. Figure 3 depicts the idealized version of this
primitive.
More formally, the following is achieved in [19, Theo-
rem 5.6], where we refer to [52] for the exact parameters used
in the security condition for Alice.
Lemma II.5 (Interactive Hashing [19], [52]). There exists a
protocol called interactive hashing (IH) between two players,
Alice and Bob, where Alice has no input, Bob has input W t ∈
{0, 1}t and both players output (W t0 ,W t1) ∈ {0, 1}t×{0, 1}t,
satisfying the following:
Correctness: If both players are honest, then W t0 6=W t1 and
there exists a D ∈ {0, 1} such that W tD =W t. Furthermore,
the distribution of W t1−D is uniform on {0, 1}t\{W t}.
Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then W t0 6= W t1 and there
exists a D ∈ {0, 1} such that W tD = W t. If Bob chooses W t
uniformly at random, then D is uniform and independent of
Alice’s view.
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then for every subset
S ⊆ {0, 1}t,
Pr[W t0 ∈ S and W t1 ∈ S] ≤ 16 ·
|S|
2t
Note that even though this is not explicitly mentioned
in [52], aborts need to be treated as explained in Section II-D3
to achieve Lemma II.5.
III. WEAK STRING ERASURE IN THE NOISY-STORAGE
MODEL
We are now ready to introduce our main primitive. After
giving a precise security definition in Section III-A, we present
a protocol for realizing this primitive in the noisy-storage
model. We will subsequently show that the protocol satisfies
the given security definition.
A. Definition
“Strong” versus weak string erasure: In an ideal world,
string erasure would realize the ideal functionality de-
picted in Figure 4: It takes no inputs, but provides Al-
ice with a uniformly distributed string n-bit string Xn =
(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, while Bob receives a random subset
I = {i1, . . . , i|I|} ⊂ 2[n] and the substring XI . The set of
indices I would be randomly distributed over all the set 2[n]
of all subsets of [n]. Intuitively, we think of the complement
of I as the locations of the “erased” bits.
Ideally, we would like to realize the functionality in Figure 4
in such a way that even a dishonest party cannot learn anything
at all beyond what is provided by the box. Unfortunately,
this definition is too stringent to be achieved by our protocol.
We therefore relax our functionality to weak string erasure,
where the players may gain a small amount of additional
information. More precisely, we allow a dishonest Bob to learn
some information about Xn possibly different from (I, XI).
However, we demand that his total information about Xn is
limited: given a dishonest Bob’s system B′, he still has some
residual amount of uncertainty about Xn. For a dishonest
Alice, we essentially retain the strong security property that
she does not learn anything about the set of indices I that
Bob receives. In order to obtain bit commitment and oblivious
transfer later on, we also demand one additional property that
may seem superfluous from a classical perspective, namely
that Alice is “committed” to a choice of Xn at the end of
the protocol. This difficulty arises since unlike in a classical
setting, a dishonest Alice may for example store some quantum
information and perform measurements only at a later time.
This may allow her to determine parts of Xn after the protocol
is completed. Security against such attacks is subtle to define
in a quantum setting. To address this problem, we define
security in terms of an “ideal” state σA′XnIXI that could
have been obtained by an honest Alice by preparing some
state on A′ using Xn (i.e., by post-processing). Our security
definition then demands that the actual state ρA′B shared by
dishonest Alice and honest Bob after the execution of the
protocol has the same form as the partial trace of the ideal
state, that is, ρA′B = σA′IXI .
Formal definition: In the following definition of weak string
erasure, we write ρAB for the resulting state at the end of the
protocol if both parties are honest, ρA′B is Alice is dishonest
and ρAB′ if Bob is dishonest. Our definition is phrased in
terms of ideal states denoted by σ that exhibit all the desired
properties of weak string erasure. We then demand that the
actual states ρ created during a real execution of the protocol
are at least ε-close to such ideal states no matter what kind of
attack the dishonest party may perform.
Definition III.1. An (n, λ, ε)-weak string erasure (WSE)
scheme is a protocol between Alice and Bob satisfying the
following properties:
Correctness: If both parties are honest, then the ideal state
σXnIXI is defined such that
a) The joint distribution of the n-bit string Xn and the subset
I is uniform:
σXnI = τ{0,1}n ⊗ τ2[n] , (33)
b) The joint state ρAB created by the real protocol is equal
to the ideal state:
ρAB = σXnIXI . (34)
where we identify (A,B) with (Xn, IXI).
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then there exists an
ideal state σXnB′ such that
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Fig. 3. The concept of interactive hashing (IH): Honest Bob has input W t. Interactive hashing creates substrings W t
0
and W t
1
such that there exists
D ∈ {0, 1} with W tD =W
t
, where D is unknown to Alice, and Bob has little control over the choice of W t
1−D .
WSE
Alice Bob
Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) I, XI
Fig. 4. The ideal functionality of string erasure. The actual weak string erasure is somewhat weaker. However, a dishonest party cannot gain significantly
more information from the protocol than provided by the “box” depicted above.
a) The amount of information B′ gives Bob about Xn is
limited:
1
n
H∞(X
n|B′)σ ≥ λ
b) The joint state ρAB′ created by the real protocol is ε-close
to the ideal state:
σXnB′ ≈ε ρAB′
where we identify (Xn, B′) with (A,B′).
Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then there exists an ideal
state σA′X̂nI , where X̂
n ∈ {0, 1}n and I ⊆ [n] such that
a) The random variable I is independent of A′X̂n and
uniformly distributed over 2[n]:
σA′X̂nI = σA′X̂n ⊗ τ2[n] .
b) The joint state ρA′B created by the real protocol condition
on the event that Alice does not abort is equal to the ideal
state:
ρA′B = σA′(IX̂I)
where we identify (A′, B) with (A′, IX̂I).
Note that we do not require Xn to be uniform when Bob is
dishonest. To show security of bit commitment and oblivious
transfer we will only require that Xn has high min-entropy.
The condition that the real state is close to an ideal state having
high min-entropy means that the real state has smooth min-
entropy as outlined in Section II.
B. Protocol
We now consider a simple protocol achieving weak string
erasure in the noisy-storage model using BB84-states. Other
encodings are certainly possible, and we will discuss some
of the implications of this choice of encoding in Section VI.
This protocol is essentially identical to the first step of known
protocols for quantum key distribution [65], [4]. However, as
explained in the last section, our security requirements differ
greatly as we are dealing with two mutually distrustful parties.
Protocol 1: Weak String Erasure (WSE)
Outputs: xn ∈ {0, 1}n to Alice, (I, z|I|) ∈ 2[n]×{0, 1}|I|
to Bob.
1. Alice: Chooses a string xn ∈R {0, 1}n and bases-
specifying string θn ∈R {0, 1}n uniformly at ran-
dom. She encodes each bit xi in the basis given by
θi (i.e., as Hθi |xi〉) and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob: Chooses a basis string θ˜n ∈R {0, 1}n
uniformly at random. When receiving the i-th qubit,
Bob measures it in the basis given by θ˜i to obtain
outcome x˜i.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
3. Alice: Sends the basis information θn to Bob, and
outputs xn.
4. Bob: Computes I := {i ∈ [n] | θi = θ˜i}, and
outputs (I, z|I|) := (I, x˜I).
Our main claim is the following:
Theorem III.2 (Weak string erasure). (i) Let δ ∈]0, 12 [ and
let Bob’s storage be given by F : B(Hin) → B(Hout).
Then Protocol 1 is an (n, λ(δ, n), ε(δ, n))-weak string
erasure protocol with min-entropy rate
λ(δ, n) = − 1
n
logPFsucc
((
1
2
− δ
)
· n
)
,
and error
ε(δ, n) = 2 exp
(
− δ
2
512(4 + log 1δ )
2
· n
)
. (35)
(ii) Suppose F = N⊗νn for a storage rate ν > 0, N
satisfying the strong-converse property (4) and having
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x˜1, . . . , x˜n
⊥
θ˜1, . . . , θ˜n • ⊕ •
Honest Bob (time t)
θ1, . . . , θn • •
Honest Alice Honest Bob
(time t+∆t)
Fig. 5. The protocol as a circuit. Alice chooses a random string xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n. She then encodes the bits in random bases specified
by θn = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ {0, 1}n and sends the corresponding quantum states to Bob. Bob measures in random bases specified by θ˜n = (θ˜1, . . . , θ˜n) ∈
{0, 1}n obtaining measurement outcomes x˜n = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n). Upon reception of the basis string θn, Bob determines the locations where he measured in the
same basis by computing the bit-wise xor θn ⊕ θ˜n = (θ1 ⊕ θ˜1, . . . , θn ⊕ θ˜n). He subsequently discards the bits he measured in the wrong bases (indicated
by ⊥: this replaces the classical input symbol by an erasure symbol).
capacity CN bounded by
CN · ν < 1
2
.
Let δ ∈]0, 12 − CN · ν[. Then Protocol 1 is an
(n, λ˜(δ), ε(δ, n))-weak string erasure protocol for suf-
ficiently large n, where
λ˜(δ) = ν · γN
(
1/2− δ
ν
)
.
It is easy to see that that the protocol is correct if both
parties are honest: if Alice is honest, her string Xn = xn
is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}n as desired, and
if Bob is honest, he will clearly obtain x˜i = xi whenever
i ∈ I for a random subset I ⊆ [n]. The remainder of
Section III is thus devoted to proving security if one of the
parties is dishonest: In Section III-C, we use the properties
of the channel F to show that the protocol is secure against
a dishonest Bob. In Section III-D, we argue that the protocol
satisfies Definition III.1 when Alice is dishonest.
C. Security for honest Alice
We now show that for any cheating strategy of a dishonest
Bob, his min-entropy about the string Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) is
large. Before turning to the proof, we first explain in Figure 6
how our model restricts the actions of Bob in our protocol.
At time t, Bob receives an encoding of a classical string
xn = (x1, . . . , xn) which he would like to reconstruct as
accurately as possible. To this end, he can apply any CPTPM
E : B((C2)⊗n)→ B(Hin⊗HK) with the following property:
For any input state ρ on (C2)⊗n, he obtains an output state
ζQinK = E(ρ), where Qin is the quantum information he will
put into his quantum storage, and K is any additional classical
information he retains. Note that we allow an arbitrary amount
of classical storage, that is, HK may be arbitrarily large9. We
call the map E Bob’s encoding attack.
We can think of the encoding attack E as being composed
of two steps, E = (IQin ⊗ K) ◦ E1 where Bob first applies
an arbitrary CPTPM E1 : B((C2)⊗n)→ B(HQin ⊗HQ˜), and
subsequently performs a measurement K : B(HQ˜)→ B(HK)
9It is sufficient for any adversary to store 2n bits, one for each possible
basis string Θn [1].
on HQ˜. The outcome of this measurement forms his classical
information K = K(Q˜). For example, Bob can measure some
of the incoming qubits, or encode some information using an
error-correcting code. The joint state before his storage noise
is applied is hence given by
ρXnΘnKQin =
1
(2n)2
∑
xn,θn∈{0,1}n
k∈K
PK|Xn=xn,Θn=θn(k)πxn ⊗ πθn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Alice
⊗ πk ⊗ ζxnθnk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob
(36)
where ζxnθnk is the conditional state on Hin conditioned
on the string Xn = xn, the basis choice Θn = θn and
Bob’s classical measurement outcome K = k. Here we used
the abbreviation πx := |x〉〈x|. The state (36) is completely
determined by Bob’s encoding attack E at time t.
Bob’s storage Qin then undergoes noise described by F :
B(Hin)→ B(Hout), and the state evolves to ρXnΘnKF(Qin).
At time t+∆t, Bob additionally receives the basis information
Θn = θn. The joint state is now given by
ρXnΘnKF(Qin) =
1
(2n)2
∑
xn, θn∈{0,1}n
k∈K
PK|Xn=xn,Θn=θn(k) πxn︸︷︷︸
Alice
⊗ πθn ⊗ πk ⊗F(ζxnθnk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob B′
,
(37)
where Bob holds B′ = ΘnKF(Qin). We now show that Bob’s
information B′ about Xn is limited for large n.
Theorem III.3 (Security for Alice). Fix δ ∈]0, 12 [ and let
ε = 2 exp
(
− (δ/4)
2
32(2 + log 4δ )
2
· n
)
.
Then for any attack of a dishonest Bob with storage F :
B(Hin)→ B(Hout), there exists a cq-state σXnB′ such that
1) σXnB′ ≈ε ρXnB′ ,
2mm
2) 1nH∞(Xn|B′)σ ≥ − 1n logPFsucc
((
1
2 − δ
)
n
)
,
2mm
where ρXnB′ is given by (37). In particular, if, for some R <
1
2 , we have limn→∞− 1n logPFsucc(nR) > 0, then ρXnB′ is
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n |xn〉
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Storage F Measure guess x
ρaux
Q˜
FE

classical K •
Encoding attack E
θn
Basis information•
Time t Time t+∆t
Fig. 6. The most general structure of a cheating Bob. Bob’s action at time t consists of a CPTPM E1, followed by a (partial) measurement K, where he may
use an arbitrary ancilla ρaux. At time t+∆t, Bob can try to reconstruct xn = (x1, . . . , xn) given the content F(Qin) of the storage device, the classical
measurement result K = K(Q˜), and the basis information θn = (θ1, . . . , θn).
exponentially close (in n) to a state σXnB′ with constant min-
entropy rate 1nH∞(X
n|B′)σ .
Proof: We use the notation introduced in (37). By
definition (15) of the smooth min-entropy, statements (1)
and (2) follow if we show that the smooth min-entropy
rate 1nH
ε
∞(X
n|B′)ρ is lower bounded by the expression on
the rhs. in (2). By the uncertainty relation (19), we have
Hε/2∞ (X
n|ΘnK)ρ ≥ n
2
− nδ
2
.
Using Lemma II.2 applied to T = (Θn,K), we conclude that
for Qout = F(Qin) after the noise F there exists the claimed
ideal state and
Hε∞(X
n|ΘnKQout)ρ ≥ − logPFsucc
(
n
2
− nδ
2
− log 2
ε
)
≥ − logPFsucc
(
n
2
− nδ
2
− nδ
2
)
,
where the final inequality follows from the monotonicity
property of the success probability PFsucc(m) ≤ PFsucc(m′) for
m ≥ m′ and the fact that log 2ε ≤ δ2n because (δ/4)2/(32(2−
log δ/4)2) ≤ δ/2 for any 0 < δ < 1/2.
Let us specialize Theorem III.3 to the case where F is a
tensor product channel.
Corollary III.4. Let Bob’s storage be described by F =
N⊗νn with ν > 0, where N satisfies the strong-converse
property (4), and
CN · ν < 1
2
.
Fix δ ∈]0, 12 −CN · ν[, and let ε = ε(δ, n) be defined by (35).
Then for any attack of a dishonest Bob, there exists a cq-state
σXnB′ such that
1) σXnB′ ≈ε ρXnB′ ,
2) 1nH∞(Xn|B′)σ ≥ ν · γN
(
1/2−δ
ν
)
> 0,
where ρXnB′ is given by (37).
Proof: Substituting n by νn and R by R/ν, the strong-
converse property (4) turns into
− 1
n
logPN
⊗νn
succ (nR) ≥ ν · γN (R/ν)
for sufficiently large n. The claim then follows from Theo-
rem III.3 by setting R := 12 − δ.
Theorem III.3 and Corollary III.4 establish the first part of
Theorem III.2. It remains to analyze the security against a
dishonest Alice.
D. Security for honest Bob
When Alice is dishonest, it is intuitively obvious that she is
unable to gain any information about the index set I, since she
never receives any information from Bob during our protocol.
Yet, in order to obtain bit commitment and oblivious transfer
from weak string erasure we require a more careful security
analysis. Figure 7 depicts the form of any interaction between
a cheating Alice and an honest Bob. Since Alice takes no
input in the protocol, her actions are completely specified by
the state ρQAΘnT she outputs, where HQA ∼= (C2)⊗n is an
n-qubit register that she sends to Bob (in the case where Alice
is honest, this encodes the string Xn), Θn is some classical
n-bit string (in the case where Alice is honest, this encodes the
bases), and HT is an auxiliary register of Alice corresponding
to the (quantum) information she holds after execution of the
protocol. In the actual protocol, an honest Bob proceeds as
shown in Figure 5, that is,
1) Upon receipt of QA at time t, an honest Bob mea-
sures in randomly chosen bases specified by the string
Θ˜n = (Θ˜1, . . . , Θ˜n) ∈ {0, 1}n, obtaining measurement
outcomes X˜n = (X˜1, . . . , X˜n).
2) After receiving Θn = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn) at time t + ∆t, he
computes the intersecting set I defined by Θ˜n and Θn,
and the corresponding substring X˜I .
The protocol thus creates some state ρA′IX˜I , where A
′ =
(ΘnT ) is Alice’s information, and B = (IX˜I) is the infor-
mation obtained by Bob. Note that this state can be obtained
from ρA′XnΘnΘ˜n because I is a function of Θn and Θ˜n, and
X˜I is a function of X˜n and I.
Theorem III.5 (Security for Bob). Protocol 1 satisfies security
for honest Bob.
Proof: We now construct a state σA′XˆnI with the required
properties. For simplicity, we give an algorithmic description
of this state. It is obtained by letting Alice and Bob interact
with a simulator which has perfect quantum memory. Note
that this simulator is purely imaginary and is merely used to
specify the desired ideal state σA′XˆnI . However, we will later
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Alice
Honest Bob(t)
Honest Bob(t+∆t)
QA x˜
n, θ˜n
(I, X˜n)
θn
T
Fig. 7. This circuit shows the interaction between a dishonest party Alice and an honest Bob: Alice sends some n-qubit register QA and n classical bits
θn to Bob, and also retains some possibly quantum register T . Honest Bob computes I and X˜n as before. This generates an overall state ρ
ΘnTIX˜n
, where
Alice’s information A′ after execution consists of the classical string Θn and T .
show that the real state created during the protocol equals this
ideal state on the registers held by Alice and Bob. Figure 8
summarizes the actions of the simulator:
1) First, the simulator measures the n-qubits QA in the
bases specified by the bits Θn = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn), obtaining
measurement outcomes Xˆn = (Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn).
2) Second, the simulator re-encodes the measurement out-
comes Xˆn using randomly chosen bases specified by
Θˆn = (Θˆ1, . . . , Θˆn) ∈R {0, 1}n. He then sends the
corresponding qubits to Bob (i.e., the states H θˆi |xˆi〉).
We call this quantum register QˆA.
3) Finally, the simulator provides Bob with the basis string
Θˆn = (Θˆ1, . . . , Θˆn).
An honest Bob proceeds as before, but with Θn replaced by
the simulator’s string Θˆn, and QA replaced by the simulator’s
quantum message QˆA. As before, Alice’s information A′ =
(TΘn) consists of the string Θn and her (quantum) system T .
The state σA′IX˜I held by Alice and Bob can be obtained
from σA′XˆnΘˆnΘ˜n , noting that XˆI = X˜I .
Let us argue that σA′(IXˆI) has the properties required by
Definition III.1. First, observe that
σA′XˆnΘˆnΘ˜n = σA′Xˆn ⊗ τ{0,1}n ⊗ τ{0,1}n ,
since both Θˆn and Θ˜n are chosen uniformly and independently
at random by the simulator and Bob, respectively. Since the
set I consists of those indices where Θˆn and Θ˜n agree, we
conclude that I is uniform on the set of subsets of [n], and
independent of A′Θˆn. That is, the previous identity implies
σA′XˆnI = σA′Xˆn ⊗ τ2[n] , (38)
as desired.
It remains to prove that the state created during the real
protocol equals this ideal state, that is,
ρA′B = σ(ΘnT )(IXˆI) . (39)
To produce the state σ(ΘnT )(IXˆI), honest Bob (interacting
with the simulator) measures all qubits in the bases Θ˜n. Since
we are only interested in XˆI , we could instead apply the
first measurement and re-encoding (by the simulator) and the
second measurement (by Bob) only on the qubits in I without
affecting the output. But since for all i ∈ I, we have Θˆi = Θ˜i,
the re-encoding and the second measurement are always in
the same basis, and can therefore be removed. Therefore, the
state σΘnTIXˆI can also be produced in the following way: Let
Alice output registers (QA,Θn, T ). We first choose I ⊂ [n]
uniformly at random. Then, we measure all qubits in I in
bases ΘI to get XˆI , and output registers (Θn, T, I, XˆI).
Since all qubits in the complement Ic are discarded anyway,
we can measure them in Θ˜Ic without affecting the reduced
state σΘnTIXˆI . But this exactly what happens in the real
protocol producing the state ρA′B , which implies Eq. (39).
E. Application to concrete tensor product channels
We examine the security parameters we can obtain for
several well-known channels. A simple example is the d-
dimensional depolarizing channel defined in (5), which re-
places the input state ρ with the completely mixed state with
probability 1 − r. Another simple example is the one-qubit
two-Pauli channel [30]
NPauli(ρ) := rρ+ 1− r
2
XρX +
1− r
2
ZρZ .
Both these channels obey the strong-converse property (4)
(see [36]), allowing us to obtain security of weak string erasure
by Corollary III.4.
For simplicity, we first consider the case where the storage
rate is ν = 1, that is, Bob’s storage system is (Cd)⊗n, i.e.,
n copies of a d-dimensional system, and his noise channel
is F = N⊗n. We first determine the values of r that
allow for a secure implementation of weak string erasure.
By Corollary III.4, the capacity of the channel N must be
bounded by CN < 12 . The table given in Figure 9 summarizes
the relevant parameters.
When allowing storage rates other than ν = 1, we may
again consider the regime where our proof provides security.
Figure 10 examines this setting for the qutrit depolarizing
channel and the two-Pauli channel, respectively.
To determine the exact security of the protocol, we need to
compute the min-entropy rate
λ(δ) = ν · γN
(
1/2− δ
ν
)
,
as stated in Corollary III.4. For the class of channels N :
B(Cd) → B(Cd) considered in [36], the strong converse
property (4) was shown to be satisifed with the function γN
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xˆn
H
QˆA
Bob(t)
x˜n, θ˜n
Bob(t+∆t)
θn • θˆn •
T
Simulator
Fig. 8. In the security proof, we put an intermediate “simulator” between Alice and Bob to generate the state σ
A′XˆnI
. We will show the security
definition III.1 is satisfied with σ
A′XˆnI
. The simulator measures the quantum register in the basis specified by the bit string. He then encodes the measurement
result Xˆn = (Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn) into randomly chosen bases.
Channel Capacity CN Reference Threshold
Qubit depolarizing 1 + 1+r2 log 1+r2 + 1−r2 log 1−r2 [31] r ≤ 0.77
Qutrit depolarizing log 3 + (r + 1−r3 ) log (r + 1−r3 )+ 2 1−r3 log 1−r3 [31] r ≤ 0.61
Two-Pauli 1− h
(
1+max(r,2r−1)
2
)
[30] r ≤ 0.77
Fig. 9. A sufficient condition for achieving security (for storage rate ν = 1) is that the noise parameter r lies below the threshold given above. This is
equivalent to CN < 12 .
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0.0
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0.4
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secure realization
?
ν
r
Fig. 10. Tradeoff between ν and r: security can be obtained for the
qutrit depolarizing channel below solid blue line and the two-Pauli channel
below the dashed red line. Note, however, that for the same storage rate the
dimension of the storage system is larger for the qutrit than for the qubit
channel.
given by
γN (R) = max
α≥1
α− 1
α
(
R − log d+ Sminα (N )
)
,
where Sminα (N ) is the minimum output α-Re´nyi-entropy of the
channel. For the d-dimensional depolarizing channel (see (5))
we may rewrite this expression [31] as
γN (R) = max
α≥1

α− 1
α
(R − log d)
− 1
α
log

(
r +
1− r
d
)α
+ (d− 1)
(
1− r
d
)α


.
Figure 11 shows how the min-entropy rate λ(δ) relates to
the noise parameter r for the qubit and qutrit depolarizing
channels for a storage rate of ν = 1 and error δ = 0.01.
The figure shows that the min-entropy rate we can achieve in
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
r
λ
Fig. 11. The value of the min-entropy rate λ for the qubit depolarizing
channel (dashed red line) and the qutrit depolarizing channel (solid blue line)
as a function of the noise parameter r, for ν = 1 and δ = 0.01. Using qutrits
means that the dimension of the overall storage system is higher, and we
expect the resulting higher capacity to lead to a smaller min-entropy rate λ.
Our analysis confirms this intuition.
our protocol is directly related to the amount of noise in the
storage.
IV. BIT COMMITMENT FROM WEAK STRING ERASURE
A. Definition
Informally, a standard commitment scheme consists of a
Commit and an Open primitive between two parties Alice and
Bob. First, Alice and Bob execute the Commit primitive, where
Alice has input Y ℓ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and Bob has no input. As output,
Bob receives a notification that Alice has chosen an input Y ℓ.
Afterwards, they may execute the Open protocol, during which
Bob either accepts or rejects. If both parties are honest, Bob
always accepts and receives the value Y ℓ. If Alice is dishonest,
however, we still demand that Bob either outputs the correct
value of Y ℓ or rejects (binding). If Bob is dishonest, he should
not be able to gain any information about Y ℓ before the Open
protocol is executed (hiding).
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Here, we make use of a randomized version of a com-
mitment as depicted in Figure 12. This simplifies both our
definition, as well as the protocol. Instead of inputting her
own string Y ℓ, Alice now receives a random string Cℓ from
the Commit protocol. Note that if Alice wants to commit to a
value Y ℓ of her choice, she may simply send the xor of her
value with the random commitment Y ℓ ⊕ Cℓ to Bob at the
end of the Commit protocol.
To give a more formal definition, note that we may write
the Commit and the Open protocol as CPTPMs CAB and
OAB respectively, consisting of the local actions of honest
Alice and Bob, together with any operations they may per-
form on messages that are exchanged. When both parties are
honest, the output of the Commit protocol will be a state
CAB(ρin) = ρCℓUV for some fixed input state ρin, where
Cℓ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ is the classical output of Alice, and U and V
are the internal states of Alice and Bob respectively. Clearly,
if Alice is dishonest, she may not follow the protocol, and
we use CA′B to denote the resulting map. Note that CA′B
may not have output Cℓ, and we hence simply write ρA′V for
the resulting output state, where A′ denotes the register of a
dishonest Alice. Similarly, we use CAB′ to denote the CPTPM
corresponding to the case where Bob is dishonest, and write
ρCℓUB′ for the resulting output state, where B′ denotes the
register of a dishonest Bob.
The Open protocol can be described similarly. If both parties
are honest, the map OAB : B(HUV )→ B(HC˜ℓF ) creates the
state ηCℓC˜ℓF := (ICℓ ⊗ OAB)(ρCℓUV ), where C˜ℓ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ
and F ∈ {accept, reject} is the classical output of Bob. Again,
if Alice is dishonest, we write OA′B to denote the resulting
CPTPM with output ηA′′C˜ℓF , and if Bob is dishonest, we
write OAB′ for the resulting CPTPM with output ηCℓB′′ . The
following definition is similar to the one given in [15], but
slightly more general.
Definition IV.1. An (ℓ, ε)-randomized string commitment
scheme is a protocol between Alice and Bob satisfying the
following properties:
Correctness: If both parties are honest, then the ideal state
σCℓCℓF is defined such that
a) The distribution of Cℓ is uniform, and Bob accepts the
commitment:
σCℓF = τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ |accept〉〈accept| .
b) The joint state ηCℓC˜ℓF created by the real protocol is ε-
close to the ideal state:
ηCℓC˜ℓF ≈ε σCℓCℓF ,
where we identify (A,B) with (Cℓ, C˜ℓF ).
Security for Alice (ε-hiding): If Alice is honest, then for any
joint state ρCℓB′ created by the Commit protocol, Bob does
not learn Cℓ:
ρCℓB′ ≈ε τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ ρB′ .
Security for Bob (ε-binding): If Bob is honest, then there
exists an ideal cqq-state σCℓA′V such that for all OA′B:
a) Bob almost never accepts C˜ℓ 6= Cℓ:
For ψCℓA′′C˜ℓF = (ICℓ ⊗OA′B)(σCℓA′V ) , we have
Pr[Cℓ 6= C˜ℓ and F = accept] ≤ ε .
b) The joint state ρA′V created by the real protocol is ε-close
to the ideal state:
ρA′V ≈ε σA′V .
B. Protocol
Let ε′ > 0. To construct our protocol based on weak
string erasure, we will need a binary (n, k, d)-linear code
C ⊆ {0, 1}n, i.e., a linear code with 2k elements and minimal
distance d := 2 log 1/ε′. Let Syn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−k be
a function that outputs a parity-check syndrome for the code
C. Let Ext : {0, 1}n × R → {0, 1}ℓ be a 2-universal hash
function as defined in Section II-D1
Protocol 2a: Commit
Inputs: none. Outputs: cℓ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ to Alice.
1: Alice and Bob: Execute (n, λ, ε)-WSE. Alice gets
xn ∈ {0, 1}n, and Bob gets I ⊂ [n] and s = xI .
2: Alice: Chooses r ∈R R and sends r and w :=
Syn(xn) to Bob.
3: Alice: Outputs cℓ := Ext(xn, r) and stores xn.
Bob stores (r, w, I, s).
Protocol 2b: Open
Inputs: none. Outputs: c˜ℓ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and f ∈
{accept, reject} to Bob.
1: Alice: Sends xn to Bob.
2: Bob: If s 6= xI or w 6= Syn(xn), then he outputs
c˜ℓ := 0ℓ and f := reject. Otherwise, he outputs
c˜ℓ := Ext(xn, r) and f := accept.
Our main claim of this section is the following.
Theorem IV.2 (String commitment). The pair (2a, 2b) of pro-
tocols (Commit,Open) is an (λn−(n−k)−2 log 1/ε′, 2ε+ε′)-
randomized string commitment scheme based on one instance
of (n, λ, ε)-WSE.
The length ℓ := λn−(n−k)−2 log 1/ε′ of the commitment
depends on our choice of code C. Since we require that ℓ > 0,
we need n − k to be small compared to n, which means
that we need codes for which k/n → 1 for n → ∞. A
simple construction of codes that satisfy this can be based on
Reed-Solomon codes [48] over the field GF (2m), which are
(2m − 1, 2m− d, d)-linear codes. We can convert these codes
into binary ((2m−1)m, (2m−d)m, d)-linear codes by simply
mapping each field element to m bits. For n := (2m − 1)m,
we have n− k = (d− 1)m ≤ d(logn− 1), since n ≥ 2 · 2m
whenever m ≥ 3. Therefore, with these codes we can
achieve ℓ ≥ λn − 2 logn log 1/ε, i.e., our commitment rate
is roughly λ.
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Commit
Alice Bob
Cℓ Committed
Y ℓ ⊕ Cℓ
Open C˜ℓ, F
Fig. 12. Randomized string commitment: Alice receives a random Cℓ ∈R {0, 1}ℓ from Commit. During the Open phase, Bob outputs C˜ℓ and F . If both
parties are honest, then C˜ℓ = Cℓ and F = accept. If Alice is dishonest, Bob outputs F ∈ {accept, reject}, but C˜ℓ = Cℓ if F = accept. To obtain a
standard commitment, Alice can send the extra message indicated by the dashed line.
C. Security proof
We again show security for Alice and Bob individually.
Recall that if Bob is dishonest, our goal is to show that
his information about Cℓ is negligible. The intuition behind
this proof is that weak string erasure ensures that Bob’s
information about the string Xn is limited. Via privacy ampli-
fication we then obtain that his information about Cℓ, which
is the output of a 2-universal hash function applied to Xn, is
neglible.
Lemma IV.3 (Security for Alice). The pair of protocols
(Commit,Open) is (2ε+ ε′)-hiding.
Proof: Let ρXnB′ the cq-state created by the execution of
WSE. From the properties of WSE it follows that there exists
a state σXnB′ such that H∞(Xn|B′)σ ≥ λn and ρXnB′ ≈ε
σXnB′ . This implies that
Hε∞(X
n|B′)ρ ≥ λn .
By the chain rule (see (16)), we get
Hε∞(X
n|B′Syn(Xn))ρ ≥ λn− (n− k) = ℓ+ 2 log 1/ε′ .
Using privacy amplification (Theorem II.3), we then get that
1
2
‖ρCℓB′ − τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ ρB′‖1 ≤ 2ε+2−
1
2 ·2 log 1/ε
′−1 ≤ 2ε+ ε′ ,
as promised.
To show security for honest Bob, we need the following
property of linear codes. Note that the function Syn is linear,
i.e., for all codewords xn and x¯n, we have Syn(xn ⊕ x¯n) =
Syn(xn)⊕Syn(x¯n). Therefore, for any xn and x¯n with xn 6=
x¯n and Syn(xn) = Syn(x¯n), we have that the string Syn(xn⊕
x¯n) ∈ {0, 1}n−k is the all zero string 0n−k. From this it
follows that xn ⊕ x¯n is a codeword different from 0n. Since
all codewords except 0n have weight at least d, it follows
that xn and x¯n have distance at least d.
The intuition behind the following proof is the observation
that weak string erasures ensures that Bob knows the sub-
string XˆI of a string Xˆ . The properties of the error-correcting
code limit the set of strings Xn consistent with this substring
and the given syndrome W ; this implies that Alice will be
detected with high probability if she attempts to cheat.
Lemma IV.4 (Security for Bob). The pair of protocols (Com-
mit,Open) is ε-binding.
Proof: Let ρA′B be the state shared by Alice and Bob
after the execution of WSE. From the properties of WSE it
follows that there exists a state σA′XˆnI = σA′Xˆn ⊗ τ2[n]
such that ρA′B = σA′(IXˆI), where B = (IXˆI). Let X¯n
be the closest string to Xˆn that satisfies Syn(X¯n) = W ,
and let Cℓ := Ext(X¯n, R). We will now show that the state
σCℓA′(RWIS) created during the Commit protocol satisfies the
binding condition.
First of all, note that if Alice sends Xn = X¯n, then Bob
outputs C˜ℓ = Cℓ. It thus remains to analyze the case of Xn 6=
X¯n. Note that we may write
Pr[Cℓ 6= C˜ℓ and F = accept]
= Pr
R,Xn,X¯n
Syn(Xn) 6=Syn(X¯n)
[Ext(X¯n, R) 6= Ext(Xn, R) and F = accept]
+ Pr
R,Xn,X¯n
Syn(Xn)=Syn(X¯n)
[Ext(X¯n, R) 6= Ext(Xn, R) and F = accept]
= Pr
R,Xn,X¯n
Syn(Xn)=Syn(X¯n)
[Ext(X¯n, R) 6= Ext(Xn, R) and F = accept]
where the last equality follows from the fact that Bob always
rejects if Syn(Xn) 6= Syn(X¯n).
We now show that the remaining term is small. Note that if
Syn(Xn) = Syn(X¯n), and Xn 6= X¯n, the distance between
Xn and X¯n is at least d. We also know that for our choice
of X¯n, the distance between X¯n and Xˆn is at most d/2.
Hence, Xn has distance at least d/2 to Xˆn. Since Alice does
not know I and every i ∈ [n] is in I with probability 12 , Bob
accepts with probability at most ε = 2−d/2. Hence, we obtain
Pr[Cℓ 6= C˜ℓ and F = accept] ≤ ε′ ,
as promised.
It remains to show that the protocol is correct. This follows
essentially from the properties of weak string erasure. How-
ever, we still need to demonstrate that the state we obtain from
weak string erasure has Cℓ close to uniform.
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Lemma IV.5 (Correctness). The pair of protocols (Com-
mit,Open) satisfies correctness with an error of at most 2ε+ε′.
Proof: Let ηCℓC˜ℓ be the state at the end of the pro-
tocol. It follows directly from the properties of WSE that
ηCℓC˜ℓ = ηCℓCℓ . It remains to show that this state is close
to the ideal state σCℓCℓ . By the same arguments as in Lemma
IV.3 it follows that 12‖ηCℓ −σCℓ‖1 ≤ 2ε+ ε′. Hence, we also
have 12‖ηCℓCℓ − σCℓCℓ‖1 ≤ 2ε+ ε′.
V. 1-2 OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER FROM WEAK STRING
ERASURE
A. Definition
We now show how to obtain 1-2 oblivious transfer given
access to weak string erasure. Usually, one considers a non-
randomized version of 1-2 oblivious transfer, in which Alice
has two inputs Y ℓ0 , Y ℓ1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and Bob has as input a
choice bit D ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the protocol Bob receives
Y ℓD, and Alice receives no output. The protocol is considered
secure if the parties do not gain any information beyond this
specification, that is, Alice does not learn D and there exists
some input Y ℓ1−D about which Bob remains ignorant.
Here, we again make use of fully randomized oblivious
transfer. Fully randomized oblivious transfer takes no inputs,
and outputs two strings Sℓ0, Sℓ1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ to Alice, and a choice
bit C ∈ {0, 1} and SℓC to Bob. Security means that if Alice is
dishonest, she should not learn anything about C. Similar to
weak string erasure, we also demand that two strings Sℓ0 and
Sℓ1 are created by the protocol. Intuitively, this ensures that just
like in a classical protocol, we can again think of the protocol
as being completed once Alice and Bob have exchanged their
final message. If Bob is dishonest, we demand that there exists
some random variable C such that Bob is entirely ignorant
about Sℓ1−C . That is, he may learn at most one of the two
strings which are generated.
Fully randomized oblivious transfer can easily be converted
into “standard” oblivious transfer as depicted in Figure 13
using the protocol presented in [8] (see also [2]). To obtain
non-randomized 1-2 oblivious transfer, Bob sends Alice a
message indicating whether C = D. Note that since Alice
does not know C, she also does not know anything about D.
If C = D, Alice sends Bob Y ℓ0 ⊕ Sℓ0, and Y ℓ1 ⊕ Sℓ1, otherwise
she sends Y ℓ0 ⊕Sℓ1 and Y ℓ1 ⊕Sℓ0. Clearly, if Bob does not learn
anything about Sℓ1−C , he can learn at most one of Y ℓ0 and
Y ℓ1 [8], [2].
We now provide a more formal definition, which is very
similar to the definitions in [15], [21].
Definition V.1. An (ℓ, ε)-fully randomized oblivious transfer
(FROT) scheme is a protocol between Alice and Bob satisfying
the following:
1) Correctness: If both parties are honest, then the ideal
state σSℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC is defined such that
a) The distribution over Sℓ0, Sℓ1 and C is uniform:
σSℓ0Sℓ1C = τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ τ{0,1} .
b) The real state ρSℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ created during the protocol is
ε-close to the ideal state:
ρSℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ ≈ε σSℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC , (40)
where we identify A = (Sℓ0, Sℓ1) and B = (C, Y ℓ).
2) Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then there exists an
ideal state σSℓ0Sℓ1B′C , where C is a random variable on{0, 1}, such that
a) Bob is ignorant about Sℓ1−C :
σSℓ1−CSℓCB′C ≈ε τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ σSℓCB′C .
b) The real state ρSℓ0Sℓ1B′ created during the protocol is
ε-close to the ideal state:
ρSℓ0Sℓ1B′ ≈ε σSℓ0Sℓ1B′ .
3) Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then there exists an
ideal state σA′Sℓ0Sℓ1C such that
a) Alice is ignorant about C:
σA′Sℓ0Sℓ1C = σA′Sℓ0Sℓ1 ⊗ τ{0,1} .
b) The real state ρA′CY ℓ created during the protocol is
ε-close to the ideal state:
ρA′CY ℓ ≈ε σA′CSℓC ,
where we identify B = (C, Y ℓ).
Again, we allow the protocol implementing this primitive
to abort, but demand that the security conditions are satisfied
if the protocol does not abort.
B. Protocol
We now show how to obtain a fully randomized oblivious
transfer given access to weak string erasure.
As in Section III, honest players never abort the protocol.
If the dishonest player refuses to send correctly formed mes-
sages, the honest player chooses the messages himself. Note
that we require the same also from the interactive hashing
protocol: If one player aborts it, the other terminates the inter-
action and proceeds to simulate the remainder of the protocol
himself. Indeed, this is needed to satisfy Lemma II.5, which
does not deal with aborts. By inspection of the protocols, it is
easy to see that the honest player can indeed simulate all the
other player’s messages in this way.
To obtain some intuition for the actual protocol, consider
the following naı¨ve protocol, which we only state informally.
It makes use of a 2-universal hash function Ext : {0, 1}n/4 ×
R → {0, 1}ℓ.
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FROT
Alice Bob
Sℓ0, S
ℓ
1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ C ∈ {0, 1}, SℓC
M = C ⊕D
Sℓ0 ⊕ Y ℓM , Sℓ1 ⊕ Y ℓ1−M
Fig. 13. Fully randomized 1-2-oblivious transfer when Alice and Bob are honest. Intuitively, if one of the parties is dishonest, he/she should not be able to
obtain more information from the primitive as depicted above. The dashed messages are exchanged to obtain non-randomized oblivious transfer from FROT.
Protocol 3’: Naı¨ve Protocol (informal)
Outputs: (sℓ0, sℓ1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}ℓ to Alice, and
(c, yℓ) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}ℓ to Bob
1: Alice and Bob: Execute WSE. Alice gets a string
xn ∈ {0, 1}n, Bob a set I ⊂ [n] and a string s = xI .
If |I| < n/4, Bob randomly adds elements to I
and pads the corresponding positions in s with 0s.
Otherwise, he randomly truncates I to size n/4, and
deletes the corresponding values in s.
2: Alice and Bob: Execute interactive hashing with
Bob’s input w equal to a description of I = Enc(w).
Interpret the outputs w0 and w1 as descriptions of
subsets I0 and I1 of [n].
3: Alice: Chooses r0, r1 ∈R R and sends them to
Bob.
4: Alice: Outputs (sℓ0, sℓ1) :=
(Ext(xI0 , r0),Ext(xI1 , r1)).
5: Bob: Computes c ∈ {0, 1} with I = Ic, and xI
from s. He outputs (c, yℓ) := (c,Ext(s, rc)).
For now, let us neglect the fact that the outputs of interactive
hashing are strings, and assume that the subset I1−c generated
by the interactive hashing protocol is uniformly distributed
over subsets of size n/4 not equal to I. The string xI1−c is
then obtained by sampling from the string xn, which by the
definition of weak string erasure has high min-entropy. We
therefore expect the value sℓ1−c to be uniform and independent
of Bob’s view. This should imply security for Alice, whereas
security for Bob immediately follows from the properties of
interactive hashing.
Protocol 3: WSE-to-FROT
Parameters: Integers n, β such that m := n/β is a
multiple of 4. Set t := ⌊log ( nn/4)⌋. Outputs: (sℓ0, sℓ1) ∈
{0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}ℓ to Alice, and (c, yℓ) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}ℓ
to Bob
1: Alice and Bob: Execute (n, λ, ε)-WSE. Alice
gets a string xn ∈ {0, 1}n, Bob a set I ⊂ [n] and
a string s = xI . If |I| < n/4, Bob randomly adds
elements to I and pads the corresponding positions
in s with 0s. Otherwise, he randomly truncates I to
the size n/4, and deletes the corresponding values
in s.
2: Bob:
1) Randomly chooses a string wt ∈R {0, 1}t corre-
sponding to an encoding of a subset Enc(wt) of
[n] with n/4 elements.
2) He randomly chooses a permutation π : [n]→ [n]
of the entries of x, such that he knows π(x)Enc(wt)
(that is, these bits are permutation of the bits
of s). Formally, π is uniform over permutations
satisfying the following condition: for all j ∈ [n]
and j′ := π(j), we have j ∈ I ⇔ j′ ∈ Enc(wt).
3) Bob sends π to Alice.
3: Alice and Bob: Execute interactive hashing with
Bob’s input equal to wt. They obtain wt0, wt1 ∈
{0, 1}t with wt ∈ {wt0, wt1}.
4: Alice: Chooses r0, r1 ∈R R and sends them to
Bob.
5: Alice: Outputs (sℓ0, sℓ1) :=
(Ext(π(x)Enc(wt0), r0),Ext(π(x)Enc(wt1), r1)).
6: Bob: Computes c, where wt = wtc, and
π(x)Enc(wt) from s. He outputs (c, yℓ) :=
(c,Ext(π(x)Enc(wt), rc)).
To use interactive hashing in conjunction with subsets, the
actual protocol needs an encoding of subsets Enc : {0, 1}t →
T , where T is the set of all subsets of [n] of size n/4. Here
we choose t such that 2t ≤ ( nn/4) ≤ 2 · 2t, and an injective
encoding Enc : {0, 1}t → T , i.e., no two strings are mapped
to the same subset. Note that this means that not all possible
subsets are encoded, but at least half of them. We refer to [19],
[52] for details on how to obtain such an encoding. Note that
since not every subset has an encoding, we cannot simply take
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wt := Enc−1(I). To solve this problem, we first choose a wt
uniformly at random, and then choose a random permutation
π such that Bob knows the subset encoded by wt in π(x).
Theorem V.2 (Oblivious transfer). For any constant ω ≥ 2
and β ≥ max{67, 256ω2/λ2}, the protocol WSE-to-FROT im-
plements an (ℓ, 43·2− λ
2
512ω2β
n
+2ε)-FROT from one instance of
of (n, λ, ε)-WSE, where ℓ :=
⌊((
ω−1
ω
)
λ
8 − λ
2
512ω2β
)
n− 12
⌋
.
Since this work is a proof of principle, we may choose
ω = 2. However, if we were to look at a more practical setting,
choosing other values of ω can be beneficial.
C. Security proof
We first show that the protocol is secure against a cheating
Alice. Intuitively, the properties of weak string erasure ensure
that Alice does not know which bits xI of xn are known to
Bob, that is, she is ignorant about the index set I. This implies
that essentially any partition of the bits is consistent with
Alice’s view. In particular, she does not gain much information
from the particular partition chosen by Bob. Finally, the
properties of interactive hashing ensure that she cannot gain
much information about which of the two final strings is
known to Bob.
Lemma V.3 (Security for Bob). Protocol WSE-to-FROT sat-
isfies security for Bob.
Proof: Let ρ˜A′′CY ℓ denote the joint state at the end of
the protocol, where A′′ is the quantum output of a malicious
Alice and (C, Y ℓ) is the classical output of an honest Bob.
We construct an ideal state σ˜A′′W ℓ0W ℓ1C = σ˜A′′W ℓ0W ℓ1 ⊗ τ{0,1}
that satisfies ρ˜A′′CY ℓ = σ˜A′′CW ℓC .
First, we divide a malicious Alice into two parts. The first
part interacts with Bob in the WSE protocol, after which the
state shared by Alice and Bob is ρA′XII . From the properties
of WSE it follows that there exists an ideal state σA′XˆnIXˆI
such that the reduced state satisfies ρA′XII = σA′XˆII .
The second part of Alice takes A′ as input and interacts
with Bob in the rest of the protocol. To analyze the result-
ing joint output state ρ˜A′′CY ℓ , we can use the properties
of weak string erasure, and let the second part of Alice
interact with honest Bob starting from the state σA′XˆnI .
The protocol outputs a state σ˜A′′XˆnCY ℓM , where M denotes
all classical communication during the protocol. Note that
the values Π, W t0 , W t1 , R0 and R1 can be computed from
M . Let Sℓi := Ext(Π(Xˆn)Enc(W ti ), Ri) for i ∈ {0, 1}. We
obtain the state σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ by taking the partial trace of
σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1XˆnCY ℓM
. From the construction of this state and
the fact that ρA′XII = σA′XˆII it follows directly that
ρ˜A′′CY ℓ = σ˜A′′CY ℓ and σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ = σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC . Hence
ρ˜A′′CY ℓ = σ˜A′′CSℓC .
It remains to be shown that Alice does not learn anything
about C, that is, σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1C = σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1 ⊗ τ{0,1}. From the
properties of WSE it follows that σA′XˆnI = σA′Xˆn ⊗ τ2[n] .
Since Bob randomly truncates/extends I such that |I| = n/4,
the resulting set I is also uniformly distributed over all subsets
of size n/4 and independent of A′. Hence, conditioned on any
fixed W t = wt, the permutation Π is uniform and independent
of A′. It follows that the string W t is also uniform and
independent of A′ and Π. From the properties of interactive
hashing we are guaranteed that C is uniform and independent
of Alice’s view afterwards, and hence,
σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1C = σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1 ⊗ τ{0,1} .
Second, we show that the protocol is secure against a
cheating Bob. We again first give an intuitive argument. We
have from weak string erasure that Bob gains only a limited
amount of information about the string Xn. The properties
of interactive hashing ensure that Bob has very little control
over one of the subsets of bits chosen by the interactive
hashing. Therefore, by the results on min-entropy sampling,
Bob only has limited information about these bits of Xn.
Privacy amplification can then be used to turn this into almost
complete ignorance.
Lemma V.4 (Security for Alice). Protocol WSE-to-FROT
satisfies security for Alice with an error of
41 · 2− λ
2
512ω2β
n
+ 2ε .
Proof: Let ρXnB′ be the cq-state created by the execution
of WSE. From the properties of WSE it follows that there
exists a state σXnB′ such that H∞(Xn|B′)σ ≥ λn and
ρXnB ≈ε σXnB′ , which implies that
Hε∞(X
n|B′)ρ ≥ λn .
Since the permutation Π is chosen by Bob based on his
quantum information B′, it follows from (22) that
Hε∞(Π(X
n)|ΠB′′)ρ = Hε∞(Xn|ΠB′′)ρ ≥ Hε∞(Xn|B′)ρ ,
where B′′ is Bob’s part of the shared quantum state after he
has sent Π to Alice.
Recall that our goal is to show that Bob has high min-
entropy about the string Xn restricted to one of the subsets
generated by the interactive hashing protocol. Our first step
is to count the subsets which are bad for Alice in the sense
that Bob has a lot of information about Xn. We then show
that the probability that both sets chosen via the interactive
hashing primitive lie in the bad set is exponentially small in
n.
With Lemma II.4, we conclude that for the uniform10
distribution over subsets S ⊂ [n] = [βm] of size βm/4 = |S|
Pr
S
[
Hε+4δ∞ (Π(X
n)S |SΠB′′) <
(
ω − 1
ω
)
λn
4
]
≤ δ2 , (41)
where δ = 2−mλ2/(512ω2). Let Bad be the set of all subsets
of size βm/4 that result in small min-entropy, i.e.,
Bad :=
S
∣∣∣ S ⊂ [βm] , |S| =
βm
4
and
Hε+4δ∞ (Π(X
n)S |SΠB′′) <
(
ω − 1
ω
)
λn
4
 .
10Note that, in the protocol, we do not actually sample from the uniform
distribution over subsets; the bound (41) is merely used in a counting argument
here to establish that the number of “bad” subsets is limited, cf. (42) below.
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Since we have considered the uniform distribution over all
subsets of [βm] of size βm/4, we conclude from (41) that
|{wt ∈ {0, 1}t | Enc(wt) ∈ Bad}| ≤ |Bad|
≤ ( βmβm/4)δ2
≤ 2 · 2tδ2 .
(42)
In the first inequality, we have used the fact that Enc is injec-
tive, i.e., every element in the image has exactly one preimage.
In the last inequality, we used the fact that
(
βm
βm/4
) ≤ 2 · 2t.
By the third property of the interactive hashing, we conclude
that
Pr [Enc(W t0) ∈ Bad and Enc(W t1) ∈ Bad] ≤ 16 2·2
tδ2
2t≤ 32δ2 .
(43)
Let ρ˜XnW t0W t1ΠB′′′ be the shared quantum state after the
interactive hashing, where B′′′ is Bob’s part of that state.
From (43) it follows that there exists a C ∈ {0, 1}, or more
precisely, there exists an ideal state σ˜XnW t0W t1ΠB′′′C with
ρ˜XnW t0W t1ΠB′′′ = σ˜XW t0W t1ΠB′′′ , such that
Prσ˜
[
Hε+4δ∞ (Π(X
n)Enc(W t1−C)|W t0W t1ΠB′′′)σ˜ ≥
(
ω−1
ω
)
λn
4
]
≥ 1− 32δ2 .
(44)
Note that Bob may use his quantum state during the interactive
hashing, but he cannot increase the probability of (43)
this way. Furthermore, any processing may only increase his
uncertainty. Let A be the event that the inequality in the
argument on the lhs. of (44) holds. Let
σ˜XnW t0W t1ΠB′′′CR0R1 := σ˜XnW t0W t1ΠB′′′C ⊗ τR ⊗ τR
and let Sℓ0 and Sℓ1 be calculated as stated in the protocol.
Using the chain rule (see (16)) and the fact that (R0, R1) are
independent, we get
Hε+4δ∞ (Π(X
n)Enc(W t1−C)|SℓCCR0R1W t0W t1ΠB′′′,A)σ˜
≥
(
ω − 1
ω
)
λn
4
− ℓ− 1 .
Using privacy amplification (Theorem II.3), we then have
conditioned on the event A that
‖σ˜S1−C ,SCCR0R1W t0W t1ΠB′′′ − τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ σ˜SCCR0R1W t0W t1ΠB′′′‖1
≤ 2(δ + 2ε+ 8δ) ,
(45)
since (
ω − 1
ω
)
nλ
4
− 2ℓ− 1 ≥ 2 log 1/δ = 2 · λ
2m
512ω2
,
which follows from
ℓ ≤
(
ω − 1
ω
)
λn
8
− λ
2m
512ω2
− 1
2
.
Let B∗ := (R0R1W t0W t1ΠB′′′) be Bob’s part in the output
state. Since Pr[A] ≥ 1− 32δ2, we get
σ˜S1−CSCB∗C ≈32δ2+9δ+2ε τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ σ˜SCB∗C
and
σ˜S0S1B∗ = ρ˜S0S1B∗ .
Since δ2 ≤ δ, this implies the security condition for Alice,
with a total error of at most 41δ + 2ε.
Finally, we show that the protocol is correct when Alice
and Bob are both honest.
Lemma V.5 (Correctness). Protocol WSE-to-FROT satisfies
correctness with an error of
43 · 2− λ
2
512ω2β
n
.
Proof: Let ξ := 2−n/16. We have to show that the state
ρ˜Sℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ at the end of the protocol is close to the given
ideal state σ˜Sℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC . Using the Hoeffding bound [58], the
probability that a random subset of [n] has less than n/4
elements is at most exp(−n/8) ≤ ξ. Hence the probability that
Bob has to pad s with 0s (which are likely to be incorrect)
when both parties are honest is is at most ξ. Let A be the
event that this does not happen. It remains to show that the
state ρ˜Sℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ|A is close to the given ideal state σSℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC .
Note that the correctness condition of WSE ensures that
the state created by WSE is equal to ρXnIXI = σXnIXI ,
where σXnI = τ{0,1}n ⊗ τ2n . Since I0 and I1 are chosen
independently of of Xn, XI0 and XI1 have a min-entropy
of n/4 each. Since ℓ ≤ n/8 ≤ n/4 − 2 log 1/ξ, it follows
from Theorem II.3 that SℓC is independent and ξ-close to
uniform. Since dishonest Bob is only more powerful than
honest Bob, we furthermore have from Lemma V.4 that also
Sℓ1−C is independent and uniform except with an error of at
most εˆ = 41 · 2− λ
2
512ω2β
n
, where we used the fact that Bob is
also honest during weak string erasure (ε = 0). Finally, by the
same arguments as in Lemma V.3 we have that C is uniform
and independent of Sℓ0 and Sℓ1. Hence,
ρSℓ0Sℓ1C|A ≈ξ+εˆ σSℓ0Sℓ1C .
Since the extra condition on the permutation Π implies that
Bob can indeed calculate Π(Xn)Enc(W ) from XI , we have
that Y ℓ = SℓC . Using Pr[A] ≥ 1− ξ, we get
ρSℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ ≈2ξ+εˆ σSℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC .
Finally, λ ≤ 1, β > 1 and ω ≥ 2 give us 1/16 >
λ2/(512ω2β). Adding up all errors and noting that
2 · 2− 116n ≤ 2 · 2− λ
2
512ω2β
n
,
gives our claim.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We have shown that secure bit commitment and oblivious
transfer can be obtained with unconditional security in the
noisy-storage model. We have connected the security of our
protocols to the information-carrying capacity of the noisy
channel describing the malicious party’s storage. We found a
natural tradeoff between the (classical) capacity of the storage
channel and the rates at which oblivious transfer and bit
commitment can be performed: higher noise levels lead to
stronger security.
The connection between capacities of channels and security
turns out to be directly applicable to a number of settings of
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practical interest. At the same time, our work raises several
immediate questions concerning the exact requirements for
security in the noisy-storage model. It has already led to
follow-up work: our technique of relating security to a coding
problem has been used to construct another, simpler, protocol
for oblivious transfer [54], albeit at the expense of requiring
significantly more noise in memory to achieve security. Other
channels have been shown to satisfy the strong converse prop-
erty, and hence lead to security in our model [24]. Alternate
forms of weak string erasure using high dimensional states
have been investigated using our techniques to show that in
the limit of large n, security in bounded-storage model holds
as long as a constant fraction of transmitted states is lost
(i.e., ν < 1) [40], and the security of an eavesdropper with a
noisy memory device in QKD was investigated [6]. A practical
implementation is in progress [20].
Extending security: Clearly, it is desirable to extend the
security guarantee to a wider range of noisy channels. The
limiting factor in obtaining security from a noisy storage
described by F = N⊗νn was the fact that we require the
sufficiency condition CN ·ν < 1/2 to hold (see Corollary I.2),
where ν is the storage rate and CN is the classical capacity
of N . The constant 1/2 is a result of using BB84-states, and
stems from a corresponding uncertainty relation using post-
measurement information [41]. It is a natural question whether
we can go beyond this bound using BB84-encodings.
For channels with small classical capacity, our work reduces
security to proving a strong converse for coding. Of consid-
erable practical interest are continuous-variable channels: our
results are also applicable in this case, given a suitable bound
on the information-carrying capacity.
A more challenging question is to extend security to entirely
different classes of channels than considered here. Our results
are currently restricted to channels without memory. Possibly
the most important class of channels to which our results do
not apply are those with high classical capacity. This includes
for example the dephasing channel whose classical capacity
is 1. Security tradeoffs for such a channel are known [28] for
the case of individual storage attacks [62]. For the fully general
case considered here, it is not a priori clear whether small
classical capacity is a necessary condition for security: Our
security proof overestimates the capabilities of the malicious
party by expressing his power purely by his ability to preserve
classical information. Completely different techniques may be
required to address this question.
Another way to extend our security analysis is to combine
our protocols with computationally secure protocols to achieve
security if the adversary either has noisy quantum storage or
is computationally bounded. This can be achieved by using
combiners (see [26], [25], [46]). For oblivious transfer, the
same can be achieved using the techniques of [8], [67], [12],
[14], which only requires the use of a computationally secure
bit commitment scheme.
Limits for security: We have found sufficient conditions for
security in the noisy-storage model. For concrete channels,
these conditions give regions in the plane parametrized by the
storage rate and the noise level (cf. Figure 1) where security is
achievable. Establishing outer bounds on the achievability re-
gion is an interesting open problem. Corresponding necessary
conditions could become practically relevant as technology
advances.
Note that when the adversarial player is restricted to indi-
vidual storage attacks, the optimal attacks are known [55]. It
is an open problem whether the fully general coherent attacks
considered here actually reduce the achievability region. In
contrast, both kinds of attacks are known to be equivalent in
QKD [49].
Our work is merely a proof of principle. For practical re-
alizations of our protocols, the following issues need to be
addressed:
Efficiency: One can reduce the amount of classical compu-
tation and communication needed to execute our protocols
by using techniques from derandomization. In particular, we
could use the constant-round interactive hashing protocol and
the efficient encoding of subsets from [19], randomness-
efficient samplers (see e.g., [22]), and extractors (see e.g. [56],
[35], [57]) instead of two-universal hash functions.
In practice, both the security parameter ε and the number ℓ
of bits in the commitment or oblivious transfer are fixed
constants. Savings in communication may then be obtained
by using alternative uncertainty relations (i.e., generalizations
of (18), which is tight [1] for ε = 0).
Composability: We have shown security of oblivious transfer
and bit commitment with respect to security definitions that
are motivated by composability considerations: This should
ensure that the protocols remain secure even when executed
many times e.g., sequentially. It is, however, an open problem
to show formal composability in our model as has been
done in the setting of bounded-storage [64], [21]. To this
end, a composability framework for our setting needs to be
established.
Robustness: We have considered an idealized setting where
the operations of the honest parties are error-free. In particular,
the communication channel connecting Alice and Bob was
assumed to be noiseless. In real applications, both the BB84-
state preparation by (honest) Alice, the communication, and
the measurement of (honest) Bob will be affected by noise.
To guarantee security even in such a setting, we can apply
the error-correction techniques of [55]. However, it remains to
determine the exact tradeoff between the amount of tolerable
noise of the communication channel (parametrized e.g., by the
bit error rate) and the amount of noise in the malicious player’s
storage device [13].
We conclude with a few speculative remarks on potential
applications of our work. Note that, in contrast to key dis-
tribution, general two-party computation is also interesting
at short (physical) distances. An example is the problem of
secure identification [17], where Alice wants to identify herself
to Bob (possibly an ATM machine) without ever giving her
password away. Our approach could be extended to realize this
primitive in a similar way as in [55]. It would be interesting
to find a new and more efficient protocol based directly on
weak string erasure. The setting of secure identification is
especially suitable for our model, since the short distance
between Alice and Bob implies that their communication
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channel is essentially error-free. At such short range, we could
also use visible light for which much better detectors exists
than are presently used in quantum key distribution. Note that
Alice only needs to carry a device capable of generating BB84-
states and allowing her to enter her password on a keypad. This
device does not need to store any information about Alice
herself and hence each user could carry an identical device
which is completely exchangeable among different (trusted)
users at any time. In particular, this means means that Alice’s
password is not compromised even if the device is lost. Finally,
note that Alice’s technological requirements are minimal: She
only needs a device capable of generating BB84-states. This
could potentially be small enough to be carried on a key chain.
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APPENDIX
A. The parameters for sampling – proof of Lemma II.4
For the proof of Lemma II.4, we first recall the definition
of a sampler:
Definition A.1. An (m, ξ, γ)-averaging sampler is a proba-
bility distribution over subsets S ⊂ [m] with the property that
for all (µ1, . . . , µm) ∈ [0, 1]m we have
Pr
S
[
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
µi ≤ 1
m
m∑
i=1
µi − ξ
]
≤ γ .
Choosing subsets of a fixed size at random is a prime
example of a sampler; this is the sampler we will use. The
parameters of this sampler are as follows:
Lemma A.2. Let s < m and let PS be the uniform distribution
over subsets S ⊂ [m] of size |S| = s. Then PS is an
(m, ξ, 2−sξ
2/2)-sampler for every s > 0 and ξ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: Fix s > 0 and ξ ∈ [0, 1]. In [32, Lemma 2.2], PS
was shown to be a (m, ξ, e−sξ2/2)-sampler. The claim then
follows from the fact that e−sξ2/2 ≤ 2−sξ2/2.
Replacing hmin by H∞, the following lemma follows di-
rectly from [32, Lemma 6.15 and Lemma 6.20]. The proof
follows the same step as the proof of Theorem 6.18 in [32].
Lemma A.3. Let ρZmQ be a cq-state, where Zm =
(Z1, . . . , Zm) with Zi ∈ {0, 1}β, and let PS be an (m, ξ, γ)-
averaging sampler supported on subsets S of size s = |S|.
Then
Pr
[
H4γ
1/4
∞ (ZS |SQ)
sβ
≥ H∞(Z
m|Q)
mβ
− c
]
≥ 1−√γ
where
c =
log 1/γ
2mβ
+ ξ + 2κ log 1/κ
and κ = msβ ≤ 0.15.
Specializing Lemma A.3 to the sampler defined by
Lemma A.2 gives the following statement.
Lemma A.4 (Min-entropy block sampling [32]). Let ρZmQ
be a cq-state as in Lemma A.2, and let
Hε∞(Z
m|Q)
mβ
≥ λ
be a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy rate of Zm
given Q. Let ω ≥ 2 be a constant, and assume s, β ∈ N
are such that
s ≥ m/4 and β ≥ max
{
67,
256ω2
λ2
}
. (46)
Let PS be the uniform distributions over subsets of [m] of
size s. Then
Pr
S
[
Hε+4δ∞ (ZS |Q)
sβ
≥
(
ω − 1
ω
)
λ
]
≥ 1− δ2
where δ = 2−mλ2/(512ω2).
Proof: Because of the definition of smooth min-entropy
and the fact that partial traces do not increase distance, it
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suffices to establish the claim for ε = 0. By Lemma A.2 and
Lemma A.3, we have
Pr
[
H4·2
−sξ2/8
∞ (ZS |SQ)
sβ ≥ H∞(Z
m|Q)
mβ − c
]
≥ 1− 2−sξ2/4
where c = sξ
2
4mβ + ξ + 2
√
κ
(47)
if κ = msβ ≤ 0.06. Here we used the inequalities
κ log 1/κ ≤ √κ for κ ≤ 0.06 ,
β ≥ 1 , s ≤ m and ξ ≤ 1 .
Note that the condition κ ≤ 0.06 is satisfied if s ≥ m/4 and
β ≥ 67. Setting ξ := λ/(4ω) and using s ≥ m/4 again, we
get for 256ω2/λ2 ≤ β that
c ≤ λ
2
64ω2β
+
λ
4ω
+ 4
√
1
β
≤ λ
4
214ω4
+
λ
4ω
+
λ
4ω
≤ λ
2ω
+
λ
2ω
=
λ
ω
In particular, this implies that
H∞(Z
m|Q)
mβ
− c ≥ λ− c ≥
(
ω − 1
ω
)
λ . (48)
Combining (47), (48) with sξ2 = sλ2/(16ω2) ≥ mλ2/(64ω2)
and δ = 2−mλ2/(512ω2) gives the claim.
Instead of grouping the mβ bits into m blocks Zi ∈ {0, 1}β,
let us now look at a normal bit string Xβm ∈ {0, 1}βm. The
following lemma has been proven in [66] and shows that the
bound in Lemma A.4 can also be achieved if the sample is a
subset of size sβ chosen bitwise uniformly at random.
Lemma A.5 (Min-entropy block sampling implies bit sam-
pling [66]). The bound of Lemma A.3 also applies if the sam-
ple is chosen bitwise uniformly. More generally, assume that
s,m, β, λ, λ′, ε, ε′, δ′ are such that the following holds: For
all cq-states ρZmQ with Zm = (Z1, . . . , Zm), Zi ∈ {0, 1}β
and H
ε
∞(Z
m|Q)
mβ ≥ λ, we have
Pr
T
[
Hε
′
∞(ZT |Q)
sβ
≥ λ′
]
≥ 1− δ′ , (49)
where PT is the uniform distribution over subsets of [m] of
size s. Let PS be the uniform distribution over subsets of [mβ]
of size sβ. We then have
Pr
S
[
Hε
′
∞(XS |Q)
sβ
≥ λ′
]
≥ 1− δ′
for all cq-states ρXmβQ with Xmβ ∈ {0, 1}mβ and
Hε∞(X
mβ|Q) ≥ λ.
Proof: Let ρXmβQ be a cq-state where Xmβ ∈ {0, 1}mβ.
Let S ⊂ [mβ] be chosen uniformly at random from all subsets
of size sβ and let T ⊂ [mβ] be a random subset of size sβ
chosen blockwise as in (49) (that is, after rearranging Xmβ =
Zm = (Z1, . . . , Zm) into a collection of β-bitstrings). Let
Π be a permutation chosen uniformly at random, but such
that it maps all elements in S into T . Strong subadditivity
(Theorem 3.2.12 in [49]) implies
Hε
′
∞(XS |SQ) ≥ Hε
′
∞(XS |SΠQ)
= Hε
′
∞(Π(X
mβ)T |T ΠQ) .
Note that from (S,Π) it is possible to calculate (T ,Π), and
vice-versa. Furthermore, since Π is chosen independently of
ρXmβQ, we have
Hε∞(Π(X
mβ)|ΠQ) = Hε∞(Xmβ |ΠQ) = Hε∞(Xmβ|Q) .
Since S was chosen uniformly and independently of T
and ρXmβQ, Π is independent of T and ρXmβQ. Setting
Q′ := (Q,Π), we can apply (49) to the state ρΠ(Xmβ)Q′ and
get a bound on Hε′∞(Π(Xmβ)T |T ΠQ), which then directly
implies the same bound for Hε′∞(XS |SQ).
Lemma II.4 now immediately follows by combining
Lemma A.4 with Lemma A.5.
